I agree that ‘most of the badness of death comes from the person losing future happy life’.
However, there are also other factors that are relevant to whether ‘preventing a person’s existence is close to as bad as killing them’ (this obviously also depends what is meant by ‘close to’).
The claim seems to imply that we are doing something almost as bad as murder if we are failing to have as many children as possible. But a society where legislation reflected this position would reduce the quality of life of people who don’t want many (or any) children, would force women into being baby-making machines, and would plausibly result in a situation where individual children aren’t viewed as particularly important (if one dies, well, no time to grieve—another one is on the way). This strikes me as more absurd and dystopian than advocating for human extinction.
For me, this conversation is analogous to that surrounding Peter Singer’s book The Life You Can Save (TLYCS).
In TLYCS, Peter Singer argues, in my opinion quite convincingly, that we have a moral obligation to give up everything we have to help those in extreme poverty. Singer argues that every 5000 USD we spend on ourselves and not donate is equivalent to condemning a person whose life we could have saved. He then follows up with a far more modest ask: That we donate 1% of our income to effective charities.
There are many people who balk at Singer’s conclusion that we have a moral duty to donate everything above our bare survival needs to effective charities, and then reject his comparatively modest 1% ask. They might reply:
[Singer’s] claim seems to imply that we are doing something almost as bad as murder if we are failing to [donate as much money as possible]. But a society where legislation reflected this position would reduce the quality of life of people [in developed countries to that of those in extreme poverty], would force [people in developed countries] into being [money]-making machines, and would plausibly result in a situation where individual children [in extreme poverty] aren’t viewed as particularly important (if one dies, well, no time to grieve—another one is [waiting to be saved]). This strikes me as more absurd and dystopian than advocating for human extinction.
This isn’t what EAs actually advocate for. Singer’s conclusion is far too much to ask of most people, and even the most ardent EAs would balk at legislating it. However, many EAs, myself included, would agree that Singer’s philosophical conclusion really is correct.
Similarly, I’ve made the philosophical argument that there’s little moral difference between preventing a person’s existence and killing them. Given that conclusion, there are many compelling criticisms of what personal or legislative changes should follow. However, I haven’t found any convincing rebuttal to the philosophical argument.
There are many considerations which lessen the magnitude of the conclusion. Preventing the suffering of the close friends and family of a person who dies matters. One might have a high credence in a person-affecting view, endorse the procreation asymmetry, or place substantial credence on non-consequentialist theories.
But in my opinion, if you’re a consequentialist who holds even mild credence (say ~10%) in the non-person-affecting view, then preventing a person’s existence is on the order of badness of (say, ~10% as bad as) killing them. If you disagree, then I’d love to understand your perspective further, and see if there’s some crucial consideration I may be missing.
As with Singer’s arguments in TLYCS, I don’t think the truth/falsity of a philosophical argument is contingent on how radical its conclusions are. I also don’t think the existence of radical conclusions precludes the implementation of common-sense conclusions, like donating 1% of one’s income to effective charities.
I agree that ‘most of the badness of death comes from the person losing future happy life’.
However, there are also other factors that are relevant to whether ‘preventing a person’s existence is close to as bad as killing them’ (this obviously also depends what is meant by ‘close to’).
The claim seems to imply that we are doing something almost as bad as murder if we are failing to have as many children as possible. But a society where legislation reflected this position would reduce the quality of life of people who don’t want many (or any) children, would force women into being baby-making machines, and would plausibly result in a situation where individual children aren’t viewed as particularly important (if one dies, well, no time to grieve—another one is on the way). This strikes me as more absurd and dystopian than advocating for human extinction.
For me, this conversation is analogous to that surrounding Peter Singer’s book The Life You Can Save (TLYCS).
In TLYCS, Peter Singer argues, in my opinion quite convincingly, that we have a moral obligation to give up everything we have to help those in extreme poverty. Singer argues that every 5000 USD we spend on ourselves and not donate is equivalent to condemning a person whose life we could have saved. He then follows up with a far more modest ask: That we donate 1% of our income to effective charities.
There are many people who balk at Singer’s conclusion that we have a moral duty to donate everything above our bare survival needs to effective charities, and then reject his comparatively modest 1% ask. They might reply:
This isn’t what EAs actually advocate for. Singer’s conclusion is far too much to ask of most people, and even the most ardent EAs would balk at legislating it. However, many EAs, myself included, would agree that Singer’s philosophical conclusion really is correct.
Similarly, I’ve made the philosophical argument that there’s little moral difference between preventing a person’s existence and killing them. Given that conclusion, there are many compelling criticisms of what personal or legislative changes should follow. However, I haven’t found any convincing rebuttal to the philosophical argument.
There are many considerations which lessen the magnitude of the conclusion. Preventing the suffering of the close friends and family of a person who dies matters. One might have a high credence in a person-affecting view, endorse the procreation asymmetry, or place substantial credence on non-consequentialist theories.
But in my opinion, if you’re a consequentialist who holds even mild credence (say ~10%) in the non-person-affecting view, then preventing a person’s existence is on the order of badness of (say, ~10% as bad as) killing them. If you disagree, then I’d love to understand your perspective further, and see if there’s some crucial consideration I may be missing.
As with Singer’s arguments in TLYCS, I don’t think the truth/falsity of a philosophical argument is contingent on how radical its conclusions are. I also don’t think the existence of radical conclusions precludes the implementation of common-sense conclusions, like donating 1% of one’s income to effective charities.