I think itās plausible that some interests matter in relative terms between possible outcomes, rather than only in terms that can be described absolutely. I think it can be the case that itās neither better nor worse in itself to have a specific preference at all, no matter how satisfied or frustrated, even though itās better for it to be more satisfied between two outcomes both in which it exists. Say a childās dream to go to the moon, or the wish of a specific person who canāt walk to walk, or the wish to be with a loved one (e.g. grief over loss). I donāt think taking away a frustrated preference makes someone better off in itself, except for certain kinds of preferences. I donāt think adding a (satisfied) preference is ever good in itself.
Part of the reason might be that thereās no natural unique 0 or neutral point, i.e. a single degree of preference satisfaction/āfrustration where we should be indifferent about having that preference at all. Or, at least, you can imagine degrees between perfectly satisfied and perfectly frustrated, but no natural way to set some partial satisfaction/āfrustration states on either side of 0.
Other common intuitions may violate IIA. We might say youāre not obligated to make a great sacrifice for others, but if you are going to, it could be obligatory to do the most good with the same level of sacrifice (see this example and the discussion in that thread). Similarly for having a child: you have no obligation to have one at all, and it may be permissible to have a child as long as they at least have a good life, but if you do have a child, and you could easily guarantee a much better life for them than just good, you may be obligated to do so. Frick discusses these as āconditional reasonsā.
I guess these reasons could apply similarly to transitivity. An important issue with intransitivity is that itās not clear what act to choose if each available option is beaten by another, but intransitive views can be turned into transitive views that violate IIA through voting methods, especially beatpath/āSchulze, like in this paper.
I think itās plausible that some interests matter in relative terms between possible outcomes, rather than only in terms that can be described absolutely. I think it can be the case that itās neither better nor worse in itself to have a specific preference at all, no matter how satisfied or frustrated, even though itās better for it to be more satisfied between two outcomes both in which it exists. Say a childās dream to go to the moon, or the wish of a specific person who canāt walk to walk, or the wish to be with a loved one (e.g. grief over loss). I donāt think taking away a frustrated preference makes someone better off in itself, except for certain kinds of preferences. I donāt think adding a (satisfied) preference is ever good in itself.
Part of the reason might be that thereās no natural unique 0 or neutral point, i.e. a single degree of preference satisfaction/āfrustration where we should be indifferent about having that preference at all. Or, at least, you can imagine degrees between perfectly satisfied and perfectly frustrated, but no natural way to set some partial satisfaction/āfrustration states on either side of 0.
Other common intuitions may violate IIA. We might say youāre not obligated to make a great sacrifice for others, but if you are going to, it could be obligatory to do the most good with the same level of sacrifice (see this example and the discussion in that thread). Similarly for having a child: you have no obligation to have one at all, and it may be permissible to have a child as long as they at least have a good life, but if you do have a child, and you could easily guarantee a much better life for them than just good, you may be obligated to do so. Frick discusses these as āconditional reasonsā.
I guess these reasons could apply similarly to transitivity. An important issue with intransitivity is that itās not clear what act to choose if each available option is beaten by another, but intransitive views can be turned into transitive views that violate IIA through voting methods, especially beatpath/āSchulze, like in this paper.