This is my favorite post for making the opportunity costs of our spending feel real and urgent.
The most compelling empirical observations have some kind of normative implications. For example, Peter Singer observed that almost everyone strongly believes that we are obligated to save a child drowning nearby, even if it requires some personal sacrifice. Combined with the basic normative principle that distance doesn’t matter morally, that observation tells us that something is wrong with our moral instincts. This post presents another such empirical fact: our attitudes and choices depend greatly on the salience of opportunity costs. Combined with the principle that such salience shouldn’t matter morally, we can deduce that something is wrong with our moral instincts.
This is my favorite post for making the opportunity costs of our spending feel real and urgent.
The most compelling empirical observations have some kind of normative implications. For example, Peter Singer observed that almost everyone strongly believes that we are obligated to save a child drowning nearby, even if it requires some personal sacrifice. Combined with the basic normative principle that distance doesn’t matter morally, that observation tells us that something is wrong with our moral instincts. This post presents another such empirical fact: our attitudes and choices depend greatly on the salience of opportunity costs. Combined with the principle that such salience shouldn’t matter morally, we can deduce that something is wrong with our moral instincts.
If you appreciate this post, you should also read Scott Alexander’s Efficient Charity and maybe Newtonian Ethics.