Congresspeople deal with a ton of different interest groups all the time trying to have their preferred policies make their way into legislation. We are competing with all of them, which makes our odds of success quite low, especially since politicians generally consult the interest groups they agree with rather than interest groups actually persuading politicians.
...
A more apt comparison in my eyes is pork. Politicians get funding all the time for projects in their districts so they can report back to their constituents. Hundreds of these things get included in many omnibus bills in order to ensure the vote of every single legislator.
I agree that pork is good comparison, since it has highly concentrated support but nonexistent opposition. But the second section I quoted above directly contradicts the first section: pork is an example of how interest groups can be effective at getting their preferred policies into legislation, even if no politician themself benefits from the pork.
It’s very rare for the groups that benefit from pork to try to steer it by themselves holding office.
I don’t think we are really competing with all other interest groups; there’s not a limited amount of legislation. There is a limited-ish budget, but it’s so high that there’s room for many different priorities already (including pork).
But I think you vastly exaggerate how much having more association EA would have with Democrats if there were a couple of Democratic EA-associated legislators in office, especially if they never really talk about EA in public.
Well, maybe. It’s really tough to evaluate hypotheticals like this; but the actually existing political campaign that I’m commenting on lead to multiple articles about EA in the national political press just from the primary, let alone the general or somebody holding office.
I don’t think this is an accurate view of pork. Pork is pushed for by legislators, not by interest groups. These projects have some support from within the district, sure, but it’s really the legislators that want them to happen so they can advertise to their constituents. Similarly EA would be much more likely to make its way into legislation if it were pushed for by a devoted legislator than by an outside interest group.
As for the articles in the press, I think Yglesias makes a pretty convincing case that these can do quite a bit of good as well; in my mind they’re probably net good, but I understand the concern.
Pork is pushed for by legislators, not by interest groups.
I don’t really understand the distinction you’re drawing. Interest groups definitely lobby to receive pork.
These projects have some support from within the district, sure, but it’s really the legislators that want them to happen so they can advertise to their constituents.
Is the claim here that the actual spending itself doesn’t matter, and the reason it occurs is solely that the politician likes to be able to talk about the spending?
That runs counter to my understanding; this paper claims otherwise for Brazil, and this paper suggests otherwise for the US.
I’m repeating myself, which I guess is a sign I’m not writing clearly. I think the way you’re looking at it is this:
Interest group lobbies → politician pushes for the pork- > pork gets included.
My claim is that the true mechanism is this:
Politician wants some funding to show constituents → may turn to interest groups in district to see what projects need funding (or may just know about projects in their home district) → politician pushes for pork → pork gets included
I agree that pork is good comparison, since it has highly concentrated support but nonexistent opposition. But the second section I quoted above directly contradicts the first section: pork is an example of how interest groups can be effective at getting their preferred policies into legislation, even if no politician themself benefits from the pork.
It’s very rare for the groups that benefit from pork to try to steer it by themselves holding office.
I don’t think we are really competing with all other interest groups; there’s not a limited amount of legislation. There is a limited-ish budget, but it’s so high that there’s room for many different priorities already (including pork).
Well, maybe. It’s really tough to evaluate hypotheticals like this; but the actually existing political campaign that I’m commenting on lead to multiple articles about EA in the national political press just from the primary, let alone the general or somebody holding office.
I don’t think this is an accurate view of pork. Pork is pushed for by legislators, not by interest groups. These projects have some support from within the district, sure, but it’s really the legislators that want them to happen so they can advertise to their constituents. Similarly EA would be much more likely to make its way into legislation if it were pushed for by a devoted legislator than by an outside interest group.
As for the articles in the press, I think Yglesias makes a pretty convincing case that these can do quite a bit of good as well; in my mind they’re probably net good, but I understand the concern.
I don’t really understand the distinction you’re drawing. Interest groups definitely lobby to receive pork.
Is the claim here that the actual spending itself doesn’t matter, and the reason it occurs is solely that the politician likes to be able to talk about the spending?
That runs counter to my understanding; this paper claims otherwise for Brazil, and this paper suggests otherwise for the US.
I’m repeating myself, which I guess is a sign I’m not writing clearly. I think the way you’re looking at it is this:
Interest group lobbies → politician pushes for the pork- > pork gets included.
My claim is that the true mechanism is this:
Politician wants some funding to show constituents → may turn to interest groups in district to see what projects need funding (or may just know about projects in their home district) → politician pushes for pork → pork gets included