Follow-up: I’ve never found Chalmers’ zombie or vulcan thought experiments at all compelling. They sound plausible at first glance as interesting edge cases, but I think they’re not at all plausible or illuminating if one asks how such a hypothetical being could have evolved, and whether their cognitive/affective architecture really makes sense. The notion of a mind that doesn’t have any valences regarding external objects, beings, or situations would boil down to a mind that can’t make any decisions, can’t learn anything (through operant conditioning), and can’t pursue any goals—i.e. not a ‘mind’ at all.
I critiqued the Chalmers zombie thought experiment in this essay from c. 1999. Also see this shorter essay about the possible functions of human consciousness, which I think center around ‘public relations’ functions in our hypersocial tribal context, more than anything else.
Follow-up: I’ve never found Chalmers’ zombie or vulcan thought experiments at all compelling. They sound plausible at first glance as interesting edge cases, but I think they’re not at all plausible or illuminating if one asks how such a hypothetical being could have evolved, and whether their cognitive/affective architecture really makes sense. The notion of a mind that doesn’t have any valences regarding external objects, beings, or situations would boil down to a mind that can’t make any decisions, can’t learn anything (through operant conditioning), and can’t pursue any goals—i.e. not a ‘mind’ at all.
I critiqued the Chalmers zombie thought experiment in this essay from c. 1999. Also see this shorter essay about the possible functions of human consciousness, which I think center around ‘public relations’ functions in our hypersocial tribal context, more than anything else.