I am using conscious and sentient as synonyms. Apologies if this is confusing.
I don’t doubt at all that all animals are sentient in the sense that you mean. But I am referring to the question of whether they have subjective experience—not just pleasure and pain signals but also a subjective experience of pleasure and pain.
This doesn’t feel like a red herring to me. Suffering only takes on a moral valence if it describes a conscious experience.
splinter—I strongly disagree on that. I think consciousness is built up out of valenced reactions to things (e.g. pleasure/pain signals); it’s not some qualitatively special overlay on top of those signals.
And I don’t agree that suffering is only morally relevant if it’s ‘consciously experienced’.
I am using conscious and sentient as synonyms. Apologies if this is confusing.
I don’t doubt at all that all animals are sentient in the sense that you mean. But I am referring to the question of whether they have subjective experience—not just pleasure and pain signals but also a subjective experience of pleasure and pain.
This doesn’t feel like a red herring to me. Suffering only takes on a moral valence if it describes a conscious experience.
splinter—I strongly disagree on that. I think consciousness is built up out of valenced reactions to things (e.g. pleasure/pain signals); it’s not some qualitatively special overlay on top of those signals.
And I don’t agree that suffering is only morally relevant if it’s ‘consciously experienced’.