The relative difference you cited between most painful and second most painful experience is interesting. Personally, I can’t even name my second most painful experience, but will probably never forget my most painful experience.
Even given the intensity of my most painful experience, I would rather do that again compared to facing a year of chronic pain because chronic pain seems so debilitating.
One thing I’m wondering about with respect to pain in animals is how they process memories, and how closely their memories alter their experience. I think that would matter because a memory of intense pain might cause ongoing psychological suffering, but I’m not sure if or which animals could have that type of experience.
Yes, I believe the salience of more intense experiences is disproportionally greater, hence the possibly disproportionally stronger memory trace.
On chronic x acute pains, this is our general impression too. With chronic pain there is the possibility of sensitization over time and multiple additional longer-term consequences.
On memory differences with other species, that is a very interesting question, one for which there is not much research available as far as I am aware. For example, observations of the Peak-End rule mentioned in the text are widespread in humans, but so far there has been only one experiment testing it in animals (dairy cows). That said, at least in vertebrates intense pain has been observed to lead to greater levels of fearfulness, reduced resilience, sensitization, among others (so if it happens early in life, the effects of intense pain are likely much more pervasive). So at least in vertebrates, either memory is present, or intense pain leads to a reconfiguration of pain coping mechanisms.
I agree that I would rather go through my most painful-ever experiences again than go through a much longer period of chronic pain because chronic pain is debilitating.
In general, I expect a lot of people to feel more averse to chronic rather than acute pain—with the assumption that the long-term effects of chronic pain are greater than those of acute—once thinking beyond themselves. That is, considering not just what they themselves would prefer, all else held equal, but also damage to their productivity and ability to help others (e.g duty to friends and family; desire to help the world). This preference might not change the lived experience of the pain, but it might still be morally relevant.
This might mean that, at a species level, relative aversiveness to different kinds of pains might depend on animals’ social roles. I wonder if social animals, particularly social insects, might be less averse to pain in a morally relevant way if the pain is contracted as a result of e.g defending the nest or hive.
This is an interesting question, relating to the evolutionary role of pain going beyond protection of the individual survival and immediate reproduction (or that of kin), but affecting the group as a whole. As you said, debilitating pain (i.e., pain that prevents individuals to function normally) for a solitary species may also have different moral implications than for a social species even if the unpleasantness of the pain experience is the same.
My impression is that it would be difficult to determine differences in pain aversiveness among species with different degrees of sociality given the confounders present. For example, there might be differences in hedonic and cognitive capacity between social and non-social species (see eg here), hence differences in aversiveness to pain for reasons other than the context of the painful experience.
The relative difference you cited between most painful and second most painful experience is interesting. Personally, I can’t even name my second most painful experience, but will probably never forget my most painful experience.
Even given the intensity of my most painful experience, I would rather do that again compared to facing a year of chronic pain because chronic pain seems so debilitating.
One thing I’m wondering about with respect to pain in animals is how they process memories, and how closely their memories alter their experience. I think that would matter because a memory of intense pain might cause ongoing psychological suffering, but I’m not sure if or which animals could have that type of experience.
Yes, I believe the salience of more intense experiences is disproportionally greater, hence the possibly disproportionally stronger memory trace.
On chronic x acute pains, this is our general impression too. With chronic pain there is the possibility of sensitization over time and multiple additional longer-term consequences.
On memory differences with other species, that is a very interesting question, one for which there is not much research available as far as I am aware. For example, observations of the Peak-End rule mentioned in the text are widespread in humans, but so far there has been only one experiment testing it in animals (dairy cows). That said, at least in vertebrates intense pain has been observed to lead to greater levels of fearfulness, reduced resilience, sensitization, among others (so if it happens early in life, the effects of intense pain are likely much more pervasive). So at least in vertebrates, either memory is present, or intense pain leads to a reconfiguration of pain coping mechanisms.
I agree that I would rather go through my most painful-ever experiences again than go through a much longer period of chronic pain because chronic pain is debilitating.
In general, I expect a lot of people to feel more averse to chronic rather than acute pain—with the assumption that the long-term effects of chronic pain are greater than those of acute—once thinking beyond themselves. That is, considering not just what they themselves would prefer, all else held equal, but also damage to their productivity and ability to help others (e.g duty to friends and family; desire to help the world). This preference might not change the lived experience of the pain, but it might still be morally relevant.
This might mean that, at a species level, relative aversiveness to different kinds of pains might depend on animals’ social roles. I wonder if social animals, particularly social insects, might be less averse to pain in a morally relevant way if the pain is contracted as a result of e.g defending the nest or hive.
This is an interesting question, relating to the evolutionary role of pain going beyond protection of the individual survival and immediate reproduction (or that of kin), but affecting the group as a whole. As you said, debilitating pain (i.e., pain that prevents individuals to function normally) for a solitary species may also have different moral implications than for a social species even if the unpleasantness of the pain experience is the same.
My impression is that it would be difficult to determine differences in pain aversiveness among species with different degrees of sociality given the confounders present. For example, there might be differences in hedonic and cognitive capacity between social and non-social species (see eg here), hence differences in aversiveness to pain for reasons other than the context of the painful experience.