Maybe this is my dualist intuitions speaking, but the suppositions here seem to be in some tension with each other. If thereās nothing āall that importantā about the identified pattern, whyever would we have identified it as the correct theory of consciousness to begin with? (The idea that āconsciousness is just one specific algorithm among manyā seems very odd to me. Surely one of the most central platitudes for fixing the concept is that it picks out something that is distinctive, or special in some way.)
If things can matter to us even though they donāt affect how we feel, we may be inclined to think that similar things can matter to systems that feel nothing at all.
One reason to reject this inference is if we accept the phenomenal intentionality thesis that consciousness is necessary for having genuinely representational states (including desires and preferences). I agree that consciousness need not be whatās represented as our goal-state; but it may still be a necessary background condition for us to have real goals at all (in contrast to the pseudo-intentionality of mere thermostats and the like).
If thereās nothing āall that importantā about the identified pattern, whyever would we have identified it as the correct theory of consciousness to begin with?
This particular argument really speaks to the more radical physicalists. I donāt think you should be that moved by it. If I were in your shoes (rather than undecided), I think Iād be more worried that people would come to jettison their concern for consciousness for bad reasons.
One reason to reject this inference is if we accept the phenomenal intentionality thesis that consciousness is necessary for having genuinely representational states (including desires and preferences). I agree that consciousness need not be whatās represented as our goal-state; but it may still be a necessary background condition for us to have real goals at all (in contrast to the pseudo-intentionality of mere thermostats and the like).
One case I had in mind while writing this was the matter of unconscious desires in a conscious person. Suppose that we have some desires that shape our motivations but which we never think about. Maybe we have a desire to be near the ocean. We donāt feel any longing, we just find ourselves quickly accepting invitations to the beach. (We also arenāt glad to receive such invitations or any happier when at the beach.) Satisfying that desire seems to me not to count for much in a large part because it has no impact on our conscious states. Would you agree? If so, would you think the intentionality thesis can make sense of this difference? Do you want to withhold intentionality from purely unconscious states in a conscious mind? Or is there a different story you would tell?
Thatās an interesting case! I am tempted to deny that this (putative unconscious desire to be near the ocean) is really a mental state at all. I get that it can be explanatorily convenient to model it as such, using folk (belief-desire) psychology, but the same is true of computer chess programs. Iād want to draw a pretty sharp distinction between the usefulness of psychological modelling, on the one hand, and grounds for attributing real mental states, on the other. And I think itās pretty natural (at least from a perspective like mine) to take consciousness to be the mark of the mental, such that any unconscious state is best understood as mere information-processing, not meaningful mentality.
Thatās an initial thought, anyway. It may be completely wrong-headed!
Hi Derek, great post! A couple of points of push-back:
Maybe this is my dualist intuitions speaking, but the suppositions here seem to be in some tension with each other. If thereās nothing āall that importantā about the identified pattern, whyever would we have identified it as the correct theory of consciousness to begin with? (The idea that āconsciousness is just one specific algorithm among manyā seems very odd to me. Surely one of the most central platitudes for fixing the concept is that it picks out something that is distinctive, or special in some way.)
One reason to reject this inference is if we accept the phenomenal intentionality thesis that consciousness is necessary for having genuinely representational states (including desires and preferences). I agree that consciousness need not be whatās represented as our goal-state; but it may still be a necessary background condition for us to have real goals at all (in contrast to the pseudo-intentionality of mere thermostats and the like).
Thanks Richard!
This particular argument really speaks to the more radical physicalists. I donāt think you should be that moved by it. If I were in your shoes (rather than undecided), I think Iād be more worried that people would come to jettison their concern for consciousness for bad reasons.
One case I had in mind while writing this was the matter of unconscious desires in a conscious person. Suppose that we have some desires that shape our motivations but which we never think about. Maybe we have a desire to be near the ocean. We donāt feel any longing, we just find ourselves quickly accepting invitations to the beach. (We also arenāt glad to receive such invitations or any happier when at the beach.) Satisfying that desire seems to me not to count for much in a large part because it has no impact on our conscious states. Would you agree? If so, would you think the intentionality thesis can make sense of this difference? Do you want to withhold intentionality from purely unconscious states in a conscious mind? Or is there a different story you would tell?
Thatās an interesting case! I am tempted to deny that this (putative unconscious desire to be near the ocean) is really a mental state at all. I get that it can be explanatorily convenient to model it as such, using folk (belief-desire) psychology, but the same is true of computer chess programs. Iād want to draw a pretty sharp distinction between the usefulness of psychological modelling, on the one hand, and grounds for attributing real mental states, on the other. And I think itās pretty natural (at least from a perspective like mine) to take consciousness to be the mark of the mental, such that any unconscious state is best understood as mere information-processing, not meaningful mentality.
Thatās an initial thought, anyway. It may be completely wrong-headed!