(1) Longtermism per se doesn’t dictate how we should weigh death vs failing to create life. I personally find it plausible to apply a modest discount against the latter. I think it would be better to bring an extra 100 happy lives into existence than to save just 1 existing person. But you’re free to apply a steeper discount if you find that most plausible on reflection. (That’s different from discounting future interests per se, as though future torture mattered less or something.)
(2) There’s no reason to focus on abortion in particular; as far as longtermism per se is concerned, any non-procreative choice (e.g. celibacy, contraception, etc.) is relevantly similar. And as I explain here, pro-natalist incentives are obviously preferable to force. (Just like we shouldn’t force people to donate kidneys, good though kidney donation is.)
Two things worth flagging:
(1) Longtermism per se doesn’t dictate how we should weigh death vs failing to create life. I personally find it plausible to apply a modest discount against the latter. I think it would be better to bring an extra 100 happy lives into existence than to save just 1 existing person. But you’re free to apply a steeper discount if you find that most plausible on reflection. (That’s different from discounting future interests per se, as though future torture mattered less or something.)
(2) There’s no reason to focus on abortion in particular; as far as longtermism per se is concerned, any non-procreative choice (e.g. celibacy, contraception, etc.) is relevantly similar. And as I explain here, pro-natalist incentives are obviously preferable to force. (Just like we shouldn’t force people to donate kidneys, good though kidney donation is.)
Am I to understand that the standard longtermist reply is to bite the bullet here?