I’m a bit concerned that this post is blurring the distinction between two different questions: “Do we have obligations to others?” and “What way of ‘framing’ effective altruism to yourself is most productive or sits best emotionally?”
For example, it may be the case that “guilt and shame are poor motivators,” but this would have no bearing on the question of whether or not we have moral obligations. People who say that we “ought to” help others don’t normally say it because they think that obligation is an instrumentally useful framing—they say it because they believe that what they’re saying is true.
Just do what you want to do.
Internalising this principle might make many people happier—and might even lead many altruistically-inclined people to do more good in the long run.
But I also think the principle is probably false. It implies, for example, that sadists and abusers should just do what they want to do as well. If there are actually any “oughtthorities to ordain what is right and what is wrong,” then it seems unlikely these oughtthorities would endorse harming others in such cases. On the other hand, if the post is right about there not being any oughtthorities (i.e. normative facts), then the principle is still at minimum no more correct than the principle that people should “just do what helps others the most.”
I’m a bit concerned that this post is blurring the distinction between two different questions: “Do we have obligations to others?” and “What way of ‘framing’ effective altruism to yourself is most productive or sits best emotionally?”
For example, it may be the case that “guilt and shame are poor motivators,” but this would have no bearing on the question of whether or not we have moral obligations. People who say that we “ought to” help others don’t normally say it because they think that obligation is an instrumentally useful framing—they say it because they believe that what they’re saying is true.
Internalising this principle might make many people happier—and might even lead many altruistically-inclined people to do more good in the long run.
But I also think the principle is probably false. It implies, for example, that sadists and abusers should just do what they want to do as well. If there are actually any “oughtthorities to ordain what is right and what is wrong,” then it seems unlikely these oughtthorities would endorse harming others in such cases. On the other hand, if the post is right about there not being any oughtthorities (i.e. normative facts), then the principle is still at minimum no more correct than the principle that people should “just do what helps others the most.”