I hold the same view as yours described here (assuming of course that I understand you correctly, which I believe I do).
FWIW I would label this view “moral anti-realist” rather than “moral realist,” although of course whether it actually qualifies as “anti-realism” or “realism” depends on what one means by those phrases, as you pointed out.
Here are two revealing statements of yours that would have lead me to strongly update my view towards you being a moral anti-realist without having to read your whole article (emphasis added):
(1) “that firm conviction is the “expressive assertivism” we talked about earlier, not amagicforce of morality.”
(2) “I disagree that there is One True Moral Standard.” “I disagree that these obligations have some sort of compelling force independent of desire.”
I hold the same view as yours described here (assuming of course that I understand you correctly, which I believe I do).
FWIW I would label this view “moral anti-realist” rather than “moral realist,” although of course whether it actually qualifies as “anti-realism” or “realism” depends on what one means by those phrases, as you pointed out.
Here are two revealing statements of yours that would have lead me to strongly update my view towards you being a moral anti-realist without having to read your whole article (emphasis added):
(1) “that firm conviction is the “expressive assertivism” we talked about earlier, not a magic force of morality.”
(2) “I disagree that there is One True Moral Standard.” “I disagree that these obligations have some sort of compelling force independent of desire.”