I’m guessing there isn’t much more we can gain by discussing further, and we’ll have to agree to disagree. I’ll just report my own intuitions here and some pointers, reframing things I’ve already said in this thread and elaborating.
It’s useful to separate the outcomes from the actions here. Let’s label the outcomes:
Nothing: the result of pressing neither button.
A: Bob getting an extra 1 util and Todd being created with a util, the result of only button 1 being pressed.
B: Todd being created with 3 utils, the result of both buttons being pressed.
On my person-affecting intuitions, I’d rank the outcomes as follows (using a different betterness relation for each set of outcomes, violating the independence of irrelevant alternatives but not transitivity):
When only Nothing and A are available, A > Nothing.
When only A and B are available, B > A.
When only Nothing and B are available, Nothing ~ B.
When all three outcomes are available, Nothing ~ B. I’m undecided on how to compare A to Nothing and B, other than that its comparison with Nothing and its comparison with B are the same. I have some sympathy for different ways of comparing A to the other two.
Now, I can say how I’d act, given the above.
If I already pressed button 1 and Nothing is no longer attainable, then we’re in case 2, so pressing button 2 and so pressing both buttons is better than only pressing button 1, because it means choosing B over A.
If starting with all three options still available, and I expect with certainty that if I press button 1, Nothing will no longer be available and I will then press button 2 — say because I know I will follow the rankings in the previous paragraph at that point —, then the outcome of pressing button 1 is B, by backward induction. Then I would be indifferent between pressing button 1 and getting outcome B, and not pressing it and getting Nothing, because B ~ Nothing.[1]
If starting with all three options still available, and for whatever reason I think there’s a chance I won’t press button 2 if I press button 1, then using statewise dominance reasoning:
If and because A > Nothing (and because B ~ Nothing) at this point, pressing button 1 would be better than not pressing either button.
If and because A < Nothing (and because B ~ Nothing) at this point, pressing button 1 would be worse than not pressing either button.
If and because A ~ Nothing (and because B ~ Nothing) at this point, I’d be indifferent.
Similarly if I’m not 100% sure that button 2 will actually even be available after pressing button 1.
My intuitions are guided mostly by something like the (actualist[2]) object interpretation and participant model of Rabinowicz and Österberg (1996)[3] and backward induction.
We might say I’m in case 3 here, because I’ve psychologically ruled out A knowing I’d definitely pick B over A. But B ~ Nothing whether we’re in case 3 or case 4.
For more on actualism as a population ethical view, see Hare (2007) and Spencer (2021). I’m developing my own actualist(-ish) view, close to weak actualism in those two papers. I’m also sympathetic to Thomas (2019) and Pummer (2024).
To the satisfaction and the object interpretations of the preference-based conception of value correspond, we believe, two different ways of viewing utilitarianism: the spectator and the participant models.
According to the former, the utilitarian attitude is embodied in an impartial benevolent spectator, who evaluates the situation objectively and from the ‘outside’. An ordinary person can approximate this attitude by detaching himself from his personal engagement in the situation. (...)
The participant model, on the other hand, puts forward as a utilitarian ideal an attitude of emotional participation in other people’s projects: the situation is to be viewed from ‘within’, not just from my own perspective, but also from the others’ points of view. The participant model assumes that, instead of distancing myself from my particular position in the world, I identify with other subjects: what it recommends is not a detached objectivity but a universalized subjectivity.
and
the object interpretation presupposes a subjectivist (or ‘projectivist’) theory of value. Values are not part of the mind-independent world but something that we project upon the world, or — more precisely — upon the whole set of possible worlds. In this sense, our intrinsic value claims, while not world-bound in their range of application, constitute an expression of a particular world-bound perspective: the perspective determined by the preferences we actually have.
I was assuming both buttons are available. Specifically, suppose Bob exists:
Bob getting an extra 1 util and Todd being created with a util is better than that not happening.
Todd being created with 3 utils is better than the scenario in 1.
I’m guessing there isn’t much more we can gain by discussing further, and we’ll have to agree to disagree. I’ll just report my own intuitions here and some pointers, reframing things I’ve already said in this thread and elaborating.
It’s useful to separate the outcomes from the actions here. Let’s label the outcomes:
Nothing: the result of pressing neither button.
A: Bob getting an extra 1 util and Todd being created with a util, the result of only button 1 being pressed.
B: Todd being created with 3 utils, the result of both buttons being pressed.
On my person-affecting intuitions, I’d rank the outcomes as follows (using a different betterness relation for each set of outcomes, violating the independence of irrelevant alternatives but not transitivity):
When only Nothing and A are available, A > Nothing.
When only A and B are available, B > A.
When only Nothing and B are available, Nothing ~ B.
When all three outcomes are available, Nothing ~ B. I’m undecided on how to compare A to Nothing and B, other than that its comparison with Nothing and its comparison with B are the same. I have some sympathy for different ways of comparing A to the other two.
Now, I can say how I’d act, given the above.
If I already pressed button 1 and Nothing is no longer attainable, then we’re in case 2, so pressing button 2 and so pressing both buttons is better than only pressing button 1, because it means choosing B over A.
If starting with all three options still available, and I expect with certainty that if I press button 1, Nothing will no longer be available and I will then press button 2 — say because I know I will follow the rankings in the previous paragraph at that point —, then the outcome of pressing button 1 is B, by backward induction. Then I would be indifferent between pressing button 1 and getting outcome B, and not pressing it and getting Nothing, because B ~ Nothing.[1]
If starting with all three options still available, and for whatever reason I think there’s a chance I won’t press button 2 if I press button 1, then using statewise dominance reasoning:
If and because A > Nothing (and because B ~ Nothing) at this point, pressing button 1 would be better than not pressing either button.
If and because A < Nothing (and because B ~ Nothing) at this point, pressing button 1 would be worse than not pressing either button.
If and because A ~ Nothing (and because B ~ Nothing) at this point, I’d be indifferent.
Similarly if I’m not 100% sure that button 2 will actually even be available after pressing button 1.
My intuitions are guided mostly by something like the (actualist[2]) object interpretation and participant model of Rabinowicz and Österberg (1996)[3] and backward induction.
We might say I’m in case 3 here, because I’ve psychologically ruled out A knowing I’d definitely pick B over A. But B ~ Nothing whether we’re in case 3 or case 4.
For more on actualism as a population ethical view, see Hare (2007) and Spencer (2021). I’m developing my own actualist(-ish) view, close to weak actualism in those two papers. I’m also sympathetic to Thomas (2019) and Pummer (2024).
Rabinowicz and Österberg (1996) write:
and