Am I correct in understanding you to be suggesting “starting a nuclear war” as an example of something so obviously c-dispreferable that only a “radical skeptic” would disagree?
If not, do you have an example of a pair of actions such that only a radical skeptic could doubt the c-preferability of one of them?
Hi Ben, no, I’m not claiming that any particular preferability judgment is undoubtable. My claim is rather that the epistemic principles grounding arguments that (e.g.) the badness of nuclear war is unbelievable seem likely to entail radical skepticism.
A proposition may be both doubtable (by some) and believable (by others), which I take to be indicative of (resolvable) epistemic difficulty rather than cluelessness.
Interesting post, thanks Richard.
Am I correct in understanding you to be suggesting “starting a nuclear war” as an example of something so obviously c-dispreferable that only a “radical skeptic” would disagree?
If not, do you have an example of a pair of actions such that only a radical skeptic could doubt the c-preferability of one of them?
Hi Ben, no, I’m not claiming that any particular preferability judgment is undoubtable. My claim is rather that the epistemic principles grounding arguments that (e.g.) the badness of nuclear war is unbelievable seem likely to entail radical skepticism.
A proposition may be both doubtable (by some) and believable (by others), which I take to be indicative of (resolvable) epistemic difficulty rather than cluelessness.