Events are not evidence to the truth of philosophical positions.
Are you sure? How about this position from Richard Chappell’s post?
(3) Self-effacing utilitarian: Ex-utilitarian, gave up the view on the grounds that doing so would be for the best.
Psychological effects of espousing a moral theory are empirical in nature. Observations about the world could cause a consequentialist to switch to some other theory on consequentialist grounds, no?
Not sure there’s a clean division between moral philosophy and moralpsychology.
I agree hastily jumping to a different theory while experiencing distress seems bad, but it seems reasonable to update a bit on the margin.
I agree investigation should be thoughtful, but now seems as good as any opportunity to discuss. You say we should wait until facts are properly established, but I think discussion now can help establish facts, the same way a detective would want to visit the scene of a crime soon after it was committed.
My understanding is that the self-effacing utilitarian is not strictly an ‘ex-utilitarian’, in that they are still using the same types of rightness criteria as a utilitarian (at least with respect to world-states). Although they may try to deceive themselves into actually believing another theory, since this would better achieve their rightness criterion, that is not the same as abandoning utilitarianism on the basis that it was somehow refuted by certain events. In other words, as you say, they’re switching theories “on consequentialist grounds”. Hence they’re still a consequentialist in the sense that is philosophically important here.
(Upvoted)
Are you sure? How about this position from Richard Chappell’s post?
Psychological effects of espousing a moral theory are empirical in nature. Observations about the world could cause a consequentialist to switch to some other theory on consequentialist grounds, no?
Not sure there’s a clean division between moral philosophy and moral psychology.
I agree hastily jumping to a different theory while experiencing distress seems bad, but it seems reasonable to update a bit on the margin.
I agree investigation should be thoughtful, but now seems as good as any opportunity to discuss. You say we should wait until facts are properly established, but I think discussion now can help establish facts, the same way a detective would want to visit the scene of a crime soon after it was committed.
My understanding is that the self-effacing utilitarian is not strictly an ‘ex-utilitarian’, in that they are still using the same types of rightness criteria as a utilitarian (at least with respect to world-states). Although they may try to deceive themselves into actually believing another theory, since this would better achieve their rightness criterion, that is not the same as abandoning utilitarianism on the basis that it was somehow refuted by certain events. In other words, as you say, they’re switching theories “on consequentialist grounds”. Hence they’re still a consequentialist in the sense that is philosophically important here.