According to The Case For Strong Longtermism, 10^36 people could ultimately inhabit the Milky Way. Under this assumption, one micro-doom is equal to 10^30 expected lives.
If a 50%-percentile AI safety researcher reduces x-risk by 31 micro-dooms, they could save about 10^31 expected lives during their career or about 10^29 expected lives per year of research. If the value of their research is spread out evenly across their entire career, then each second of AI safety research could be worth about 10^22 expected future lives which is a very high number.
These numbers sound impressive but I see several limitations of these kinds of naive calculations. I’ll use the three-part framework from What We Owe the Future to explain them:
Significance: the value of research tends to follow a long-tailed curve where most papers get very few citations and a few get an enormous number. Therefore, most research probably has low value.
Contingency: the value of some research is decreased if it would have been created anyway at some later point in time.
Longevity: it’s hard to produce research that has a lasting impact on a field or the long-term trajectory of humanity. Most research probably has a sharp drop off in impact after it is published.
After taking these factors into account, I think the value of any given AI safety research is probably much lower than naive calculations suggest. Therefore, I think grant evaluators should take into account their intuitions on what kinds of research are most valuable rather than relying on expected value calculations.
I think grant evaluators should take into account their intuitions on what kinds of research are most valuable rather than relying on expected value calculations.
In case of EV calculations where the future is part of the equation, I think using microdooms as a measure of impact is pretty practical and can resolve some of the problems inherent with dealing with enormous numbers, because many people have cruxes which are downstream of microdooms. Some think there’ll be 10^40 people, some think there’ll be 10^20. Usually, if two people disagree on how valuable the long-term future is, they don’t have a common unit of measurement for what to do today. But if they both use microdooms, they can compare things 1:1 in terms of their effect on the future, without having to flesh out all of the post-agi cruxes.
But if they both use microdooms, they can compare things 1:1 in terms of their effect on the future, without having to flesh out all of the post-agi cruxes.
I don’t think this is the case for all key disagreements, because people can disagree a lot about the duration of the period of heightened existential risk, whereas microdooms are defined as a reduction in total existential risk rather than in terms of per-period risk reduction. So two people can agree that AI safety work aimed at reducing existential risk will decrease risk by a certain amount over a given period, but one may believe such work averts 100x as many microdooms as the other because they believe the period of heightened risk is 100x shorter.
Thanks for the post. It was an interesting read.
According to The Case For Strong Longtermism, 10^36 people could ultimately inhabit the Milky Way. Under this assumption, one micro-doom is equal to 10^30 expected lives.
If a 50%-percentile AI safety researcher reduces x-risk by 31 micro-dooms, they could save about 10^31 expected lives during their career or about 10^29 expected lives per year of research. If the value of their research is spread out evenly across their entire career, then each second of AI safety research could be worth about 10^22 expected future lives which is a very high number.
These numbers sound impressive but I see several limitations of these kinds of naive calculations. I’ll use the three-part framework from What We Owe the Future to explain them:
Significance: the value of research tends to follow a long-tailed curve where most papers get very few citations and a few get an enormous number. Therefore, most research probably has low value.
Contingency: the value of some research is decreased if it would have been created anyway at some later point in time.
Longevity: it’s hard to produce research that has a lasting impact on a field or the long-term trajectory of humanity. Most research probably has a sharp drop off in impact after it is published.
After taking these factors into account, I think the value of any given AI safety research is probably much lower than naive calculations suggest. Therefore, I think grant evaluators should take into account their intuitions on what kinds of research are most valuable rather than relying on expected value calculations.
In case of EV calculations where the future is part of the equation, I think using microdooms as a measure of impact is pretty practical and can resolve some of the problems inherent with dealing with enormous numbers, because many people have cruxes which are downstream of microdooms. Some think there’ll be 10^40 people, some think there’ll be 10^20. Usually, if two people disagree on how valuable the long-term future is, they don’t have a common unit of measurement for what to do today. But if they both use microdooms, they can compare things 1:1 in terms of their effect on the future, without having to flesh out all of the post-agi cruxes.
I don’t think this is the case for all key disagreements, because people can disagree a lot about the duration of the period of heightened existential risk, whereas microdooms are defined as a reduction in total existential risk rather than in terms of per-period risk reduction. So two people can agree that AI safety work aimed at reducing existential risk will decrease risk by a certain amount over a given period, but one may believe such work averts 100x as many microdooms as the other because they believe the period of heightened risk is 100x shorter.