Only presentists have the problem in the first bullet with your specific example.
There’s a similar problem that necessitarians have if the identity of the extra person isn’t decided yet, i.e. before conception. However, they do get to learn something new, i.e. the identity. If a necessitarian knew the identity ahead of time, there would be no similar problem. (And you can modify the view to be insensitive to the identity of the child by matching counterparts across possible worlds.)
The problem in the second bullet, basically against burning bridges or “resolute choice”, doesn’t seem that big of a deal to me. You run into similar problems with Parfit’s hitchhiker and unbounded utility functions.
Maybe I can motivate this better? Say you want to have a child, but being a good parent (and ensuring high welfare for your child) seems like too much trouble and seems worse to you than not having kids, even though, conditional on having a child, it would be best.
Your options are:
No child.
Have a child, but be a meh parent. You’re better off than in 1, and the child has a net positive but just okay life.
Have a child, but work much harder to be a good parent. You’re worse off than in 2, but the child is much better off than in 2, and this outcome is better than 2 in a pairwise comparison.
In binary choices:
1 < 2, because 2 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
2 < 3, impartially by assumption.
3 < 1, because 1 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
With all three options available, I’d opt for 1, because 2 wouldn’t be impartially permissible if 3 is available, and I prefer 1 to 3. 2 is not really an option if 3 is available.
It seems okay for me to frustrate my own preference for 2 over 1 in order to avoid 3, which is even worse for me than 1. No one else is worse off for this (in a person-affecting way); the child doesn’t exist to be worse off, so has no grounds for complaint. So it seems to me to be entirely my own business.
Only presentists have the problem in the first bullet with your specific example.
There’s a similar problem that necessitarians have if the identity of the extra person isn’t decided yet, i.e. before conception. However, they do get to learn something new, i.e. the identity. If a necessitarian knew the identity ahead of time, there would be no similar problem. (And you can modify the view to be insensitive to the identity of the child by matching counterparts across possible worlds.)
The problem in the second bullet, basically against burning bridges or “resolute choice”, doesn’t seem that big of a deal to me. You run into similar problems with Parfit’s hitchhiker and unbounded utility functions.
Maybe I can motivate this better? Say you want to have a child, but being a good parent (and ensuring high welfare for your child) seems like too much trouble and seems worse to you than not having kids, even though, conditional on having a child, it would be best.
Your options are:
No child.
Have a child, but be a meh parent. You’re better off than in 1, and the child has a net positive but just okay life.
Have a child, but work much harder to be a good parent. You’re worse off than in 2, but the child is much better off than in 2, and this outcome is better than 2 in a pairwise comparison.
In binary choices:
1 < 2, because 2 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
2 < 3, impartially by assumption.
3 < 1, because 1 is better for you and no worse for your child (person-affecting).
With all three options available, I’d opt for 1, because 2 wouldn’t be impartially permissible if 3 is available, and I prefer 1 to 3. 2 is not really an option if 3 is available.
It seems okay for me to frustrate my own preference for 2 over 1 in order to avoid 3, which is even worse for me than 1. No one else is worse off for this (in a person-affecting way); the child doesn’t exist to be worse off, so has no grounds for complaint. So it seems to me to be entirely my own business.