I believe any pains are quantitatively comparable if the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states are quantitatively comparable.
I think the weakest part of the strongest version of my argument is that it requires the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states to be quantitatively comparable with certainty. If they are only quantitatively comparable with, for example, probability 99 %, pains which are 1 k infinitesimal steps apart would only be quantitatively comparable with probability 0.00432 % (= 0.99^(1*10^3)).
I think the weakest part of the strongest version of my argument is that it requires the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states to be quantitatively comparable with certainty. If they are only quantitatively comparable with, for example, probability 99 %, pains which are 1 k infinitesimal steps apart would only be quantitatively comparable with probability 0.00432 % (= 0.99^(1*10^3)).