I’m happy to see engagement with this article, and I think you make interesting points.
One bigger-picture consideration that I think you are neglecting is that even if your arguments go through (which is plausible), the argument for longtermism/​xrisk shifts significantly.
Originally, the claim is something like There is really bad risky tech There is a ton of people in the future Risky tech will prevent these people from having (positive) lives ________________________________ Reduce tech risk
On the dialectic you sketch, the claim is something like There is a lot of really bad risky tech This tech, if wielded well, can reduce the risk of all other tech to zero There is a small chance of a ton of people in the future If we wield the tech well and get a ton of people in the future, thats great _________________________________________ Reduce tech risk (and, presumably, make it powerful enough to eliminate all risk and start having kids)
I think the extra assumptions we need for your arguments against Thorstadt to go through are ones that make longtermism much less attractive to many people, including funders. They also make x-risk unattractive for people who disagree with p2 (i.e., people who do not believe in superintelligence).
I think people are aware that this makes longtermism much less attractive—I typically don’t see x-risk work being motivated in this more assumption-heavy way. And, as Thorstad usefullly points out, there is virtually no serious e(v) calculus for longtermist intervention that does a decent job at accounting for these complexities. That’s a shame, because EA at least originally seemed to be very dilligent about providing explicit, high-quality e(v) models instead of going by vibes and philosophical argument alone.
I’m happy to see engagement with this article, and I think you make interesting points.
One bigger-picture consideration that I think you are neglecting is that even if your arguments go through (which is plausible), the argument for longtermism/​xrisk shifts significantly.
Originally, the claim is something like
There is really bad risky tech
There is a ton of people in the future
Risky tech will prevent these people from having (positive) lives
________________________________
Reduce tech risk
On the dialectic you sketch, the claim is something like
There is a lot of really bad risky tech
This tech, if wielded well, can reduce the risk of all other tech to zero
There is a small chance of a ton of people in the future
If we wield the tech well and get a ton of people in the future, thats great
_________________________________________
Reduce tech risk (and, presumably, make it powerful enough to eliminate all risk and start having kids)
I think the extra assumptions we need for your arguments against Thorstadt to go through are ones that make longtermism much less attractive to many people, including funders. They also make x-risk unattractive for people who disagree with p2 (i.e., people who do not believe in superintelligence).
I think people are aware that this makes longtermism much less attractive—I typically don’t see x-risk work being motivated in this more assumption-heavy way. And, as Thorstad usefullly points out, there is virtually no serious e(v) calculus for longtermist intervention that does a decent job at accounting for these complexities. That’s a shame, because EA at least originally seemed to be very dilligent about providing explicit, high-quality e(v) models instead of going by vibes and philosophical argument alone.