I disagree that this makes it “extremely” difficult to prove that a violation of Paragraph 29 has occurred. A judge might find it hard to imagine environmental conditions that even in theory could mitigate the suffering caused by their genetics. You could feed them less, but farmers already do this with breeder birds (to prevent them from becoming overweight) and this is itself a welfare concern because it can result in starvation.
As Welfare Footprint puts it: “Although the adoption of better management practices – including lower stocking density, longer resting times and the provision of enrichment – is beneficial and desirable for improving broiler welfare, their impact is limited if the negative welfare effects inherently associated with the genetics for fast growth are not addressed.”
It is a higher bar than implied by the post, though. (See my post below for a fuller analysis of the case.)
I disagree that this makes it “extremely” difficult to prove that a violation of Paragraph 29 has occurred. A judge might find it hard to imagine environmental conditions that even in theory could mitigate the suffering caused by their genetics. You could feed them less, but farmers already do this with breeder birds (to prevent them from becoming overweight) and this is itself a welfare concern because it can result in starvation.
As Welfare Footprint puts it: “Although the adoption of better management practices – including lower stocking density, longer resting times and the provision of enrichment – is beneficial and desirable for improving broiler welfare, their impact is limited if the negative welfare effects inherently associated with the genetics for fast growth are not addressed.”
It is a higher bar than implied by the post, though. (See my post below for a fuller analysis of the case.)