This will depend on the specific view, and person-affecting views and preference-affecting views can be pretty tricky/technical, in part because they usually violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives. I’d direct you to Pummer’s paper.
I also think existing person-affecting and preference-affecting views usually do badly when choosing between more than two options, and I’m working on what I hope is a better approach.
It’s kind of disappointing that it’s not concrete enough to cash out even for such a simple and isolated decision.
I also checked out the Pummer lecture and it’s kind of weird feeling but i think he doesn’t disambiguate between “let’s make my / ours preferences more coherent” and “let’s figure out how to make social contract/coordination mechanisms/institutions more efficient and good”. It’s disappointing
I’d guess that there are concrete enough answers (although you may need to provide more info), but there are different views with different approaches, and there’s some tricky math involved in many of them.
Pummer is aiming at coherent preferences (moral views), not social contract/coordination mechanisms/institutions. It’s a piece of foundational moral philosophy, not an applied piece.
Do you think his view isn’t concrete enough, specifically? What would you expect?
>I’d guess that there are concrete enough answers (although you may need to provide more info), but there are different views with different approaches, and there’s some tricky math involved in many of them.
Yeah, I’m tempted to write a post here with chicken setup and collect the answers of different people, maybe with some control questions like “would you press a button that instantaneously and painlessly kills all the life on earth”, so I’d have a reason to disregard them without reading. But, eh
>Pummer is aiming at coherent preferences (moral views), not social contract/coordination mechanisms/institutions.
and my opinion is that he is confused what is values and what is coordination problems, so he tries to bake the solutions of coordination problems into values. I’m fine with the level of concreteness he operates under, it’s not like i had high expectations from academic philosophy
This will depend on the specific view, and person-affecting views and preference-affecting views can be pretty tricky/technical, in part because they usually violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives. I’d direct you to Pummer’s paper.
I also think existing person-affecting and preference-affecting views usually do badly when choosing between more than two options, and I’m working on what I hope is a better approach.
It’s kind of disappointing that it’s not concrete enough to cash out even for such a simple and isolated decision.
I also checked out the Pummer lecture and it’s kind of weird feeling but i think he doesn’t disambiguate between “let’s make my / ours preferences more coherent” and “let’s figure out how to make social contract/coordination mechanisms/institutions more efficient and good”. It’s disappointing
I’d guess that there are concrete enough answers (although you may need to provide more info), but there are different views with different approaches, and there’s some tricky math involved in many of them.
Pummer is aiming at coherent preferences (moral views), not social contract/coordination mechanisms/institutions. It’s a piece of foundational moral philosophy, not an applied piece.
Do you think his view isn’t concrete enough, specifically? What would you expect?
>I’d guess that there are concrete enough answers (although you may need to provide more info), but there are different views with different approaches, and there’s some tricky math involved in many of them.
Yeah, I’m tempted to write a post here with chicken setup and collect the answers of different people, maybe with some control questions like “would you press a button that instantaneously and painlessly kills all the life on earth”, so I’d have a reason to disregard them without reading. But, eh
>Pummer is aiming at coherent preferences (moral views), not social contract/coordination mechanisms/institutions.
and my opinion is that he is confused what is values and what is coordination problems, so he tries to bake the solutions of coordination problems into values. I’m fine with the level of concreteness he operates under, it’s not like i had high expectations from academic philosophy