I believe 4 years is very conservative. I’m working on a paper due November that should basically answer the question in part 1, but suffice it to say I think the ballot measures should look many times more cost-effective than corporate campaigns.
Given similar costs per hen-year per year of impact according to Laura’s report, are you expecting ballot initiatives to have longer counterfactuals than corporate campaigns? Or, do you think ballot initatives are more cost-effective per hen-year per year of impact? (Or both?)
The former, though I don’t have estimates of the counterfactual timeline of corporate campaigns. (I’d like to find a way to do that and have toyed with it a bit but currently don’t have one.)
One consideration that Peter Wildeford made me think of is that, with the initiatives that do fall under Congress’ Interstate Commerce Clause authority, we might expect the longevity to be reduced. For example, if every five years a Congressperson puts into the Farm Bill a proposal to ban states from having Prop 12-style regulations, there’s some chance this passes eventually.
Does your research include any initiatives that do fall under Congressional authority?
Although a hostile Congress could also take steps to neuter the effects of corporate campaigns. Less likely than preempting stuff like Prop 12, but we’ve seen pretty hostile legislation at the state level like so-called “ag gag” laws.
Fascinating, I hadn’t thought about that with respect to Congress. One thing I wonder about with ag-gag laws is whether they run afoul of the First Amendment. Do you know if there’s a strong legal case to be made that they’re unconstitutional?
My gut instinct here would be that it’s probably somewhat harder to pass Congressional legislation that both is constitutional and effectively limits corporate campaigns (because it’s private entities choosing what kinds of products to sell). Am I wrong here? (I am really interested in this topic, so I would love to be corrected)
From that, my guess is that some form of ag gag can be done if carefully drawn; I don’t see a conclusion that no possible law would stand as consistent with the court’s prior decision in Food Lion.
I agree that the First Amendment makes much anti-corp campaign legislation much harder to pull off. My starting point was that the FA offers less protection to purely commercial speech, especially on stuff like product labeling, and so restrictions on what the company can say in advertising its products might pass muster. That could at least weaken corporate incentives.
My other theory is whether e.g. the pork industry could convince Congress that having various different animal-welfare standards based on various corporate policies disrupted the national pork market (akin to as how much a state policy allegedly would) and justified restrictions on those corporate policies. Sounds like a stretch, but if Congress can ban you from growing weed for personal use under the Commerce Clause (and it can under Gonzales vs Raich), the effects on interstate commerce seem much greater here...
Still, between the legal concerns and political realities, I’d estimate the hostile Congress risk for corp campaigns at roughly an order of magnitude less than the risk to state legislative initiatives (low confidence).
Yeah, I think that would reduce the longevity in expectation, maybe by something like 2x. My research includes things that could hypothetically fall under congressional authority and occasionally do. (Anything could fall under congressional authority, though some might require a constitutional amendment.) So I don’t think this is dramatically out of sample, but I do think it’s worth keeping in mind.
I believe 4 years is very conservative. I’m working on a paper due November that should basically answer the question in part 1, but suffice it to say I think the ballot measures should look many times more cost-effective than corporate campaigns.
Awesome, I’m looking forward to it!
Given similar costs per hen-year per year of impact according to Laura’s report, are you expecting ballot initiatives to have longer counterfactuals than corporate campaigns? Or, do you think ballot initatives are more cost-effective per hen-year per year of impact? (Or both?)
The former, though I don’t have estimates of the counterfactual timeline of corporate campaigns. (I’d like to find a way to do that and have toyed with it a bit but currently don’t have one.)
Maybe you can get estimates for corporate campaign counterfactuals from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4219976 or based on a similar methodology?
Oh, that’s a good idea. I had thought of something quite different and broader, but this also seems like a promising approach.
One consideration that Peter Wildeford made me think of is that, with the initiatives that do fall under Congress’ Interstate Commerce Clause authority, we might expect the longevity to be reduced. For example, if every five years a Congressperson puts into the Farm Bill a proposal to ban states from having Prop 12-style regulations, there’s some chance this passes eventually.
Does your research include any initiatives that do fall under Congressional authority?
Although a hostile Congress could also take steps to neuter the effects of corporate campaigns. Less likely than preempting stuff like Prop 12, but we’ve seen pretty hostile legislation at the state level like so-called “ag gag” laws.
Fascinating, I hadn’t thought about that with respect to Congress. One thing I wonder about with ag-gag laws is whether they run afoul of the First Amendment. Do you know if there’s a strong legal case to be made that they’re unconstitutional?
My gut instinct here would be that it’s probably somewhat harder to pass Congressional legislation that both is constitutional and effectively limits corporate campaigns (because it’s private entities choosing what kinds of products to sell). Am I wrong here? (I am really interested in this topic, so I would love to be corrected)
Quickly skimmed the recent Fourth Circuit ruling striking down an ag gag statute by 2-1 vote. See https://aldf.org/article/fourth-circuit-enjoins-north-carolina-ag-gag-law/
From that, my guess is that some form of ag gag can be done if carefully drawn; I don’t see a conclusion that no possible law would stand as consistent with the court’s prior decision in Food Lion.
I agree that the First Amendment makes much anti-corp campaign legislation much harder to pull off. My starting point was that the FA offers less protection to purely commercial speech, especially on stuff like product labeling, and so restrictions on what the company can say in advertising its products might pass muster. That could at least weaken corporate incentives.
My other theory is whether e.g. the pork industry could convince Congress that having various different animal-welfare standards based on various corporate policies disrupted the national pork market (akin to as how much a state policy allegedly would) and justified restrictions on those corporate policies. Sounds like a stretch, but if Congress can ban you from growing weed for personal use under the Commerce Clause (and it can under Gonzales vs Raich), the effects on interstate commerce seem much greater here...
Still, between the legal concerns and political realities, I’d estimate the hostile Congress risk for corp campaigns at roughly an order of magnitude less than the risk to state legislative initiatives (low confidence).
Yeah, I think that would reduce the longevity in expectation, maybe by something like 2x. My research includes things that could hypothetically fall under congressional authority and occasionally do. (Anything could fall under congressional authority, though some might require a constitutional amendment.) So I don’t think this is dramatically out of sample, but I do think it’s worth keeping in mind.