Thanks, that’s kind! To be clear, we distinguish between altruism per se and moral expansiveness. You can be an altruist but have a narrow moral circle/be morally partial; and conversely you can be not so altruistic—sacrifice few resources for others -but distribute those few resources impartially. And I think that moral circle expansion is more tractable than increasing altruism—asking people to sacrifice substantially more resources to others. Also, I should make clear that I don’t hold these views with a high degree of certainty.
That’s a good point. I’ve also been wondering about how this differs between cultures (which has to be taken into consideration when designing interventions), specially after reading The WEIRDest People in the World by Joseph Henrich. A quote from the book:
The notion that market integration is associated with greater fairness or cooperation is jarring to many WEIRD people. Aren’t people from small-scale societies and rural villages highly prosocial, cooperative, and generous? Don’t markets make people self-centered, individualistic, calculating, and competitive? Yes, to both questions. To illuminate this seeming contradiction, we must distinguish interpersonal prosociality from impersonal prosociality. The kindness and generosity found in many small-scale societies and rural villages where I’ve lived and worked are rooted in intensive kin-based institutions that focus on nurturing and sustaining enduring webs of interpersonal relationships. It’s both impressive and beautiful, but this interpersonal prosociality is about relationship-specific kindness, warmth, reciprocity, and—sometimes—unconditional generosity as well as authority and deference. It’s focused on the in-group members and their networks. If you’re in the group or the network, it can feel like a long and comforting hug. By contrast, economic experiments typically tap market norms that prescribe fair dealing and honesty with strangers or anonymous others, especially in monetary transactions. This impersonal prosociality is about fairness principles, impartiality, honesty, and conditional cooperation in situations and contexts where interpersonal connections and in-group membership are deemed unnecessary or even irrelevant. In worlds dominated by impersonal contexts, people depend on anonymous markets, insurance, courts, and other impersonal institutions instead of large relational networks and personal ties.”
He also gives many examples of the “impersonal prosociality” (i.e., trust, fairness, honesty, and cooperation with anonymous others, strangers, and impersonal institutions such as the government) that we have in WEIRD societies vs. non-WEIRD societies, such as:
e.g., UN diplomats were allowed to park without paying for the ticket → diplomats from non-WEIRD societies did it much more
Non-WEIRDS give less for the common good: e.g., blood; economics game where if everyone donates money to the common cash, everyone benefits more
e.g., ultimatum game with a single run with an anonymous stranger (you have to offer some of the $100 you get, and if the receiver rejects it, nobody gets it) → WEIRD: almost everyone offers 50% (if less, they feel guilty); non-WEIRD: offer 5-25% (it already feels very generous, and don’t get why someone would reject free money)
Thanks, that’s kind! To be clear, we distinguish between altruism per se and moral expansiveness. You can be an altruist but have a narrow moral circle/be morally partial; and conversely you can be not so altruistic—sacrifice few resources for others -but distribute those few resources impartially. And I think that moral circle expansion is more tractable than increasing altruism—asking people to sacrifice substantially more resources to others. Also, I should make clear that I don’t hold these views with a high degree of certainty.
That’s a good point. I’ve also been wondering about how this differs between cultures (which has to be taken into consideration when designing interventions), specially after reading The WEIRDest People in the World by Joseph Henrich. A quote from the book:
He also gives many examples of the “impersonal prosociality” (i.e., trust, fairness, honesty, and cooperation with anonymous others, strangers, and impersonal institutions such as the government) that we have in WEIRD societies vs. non-WEIRD societies, such as:
e.g., UN diplomats were allowed to park without paying for the ticket → diplomats from non-WEIRD societies did it much more
Non-WEIRDS give less for the common good: e.g., blood; economics game where if everyone donates money to the common cash, everyone benefits more
e.g., ultimatum game with a single run with an anonymous stranger (you have to offer some of the $100 you get, and if the receiver rejects it, nobody gets it) → WEIRD: almost everyone offers 50% (if less, they feel guilty); non-WEIRD: offer 5-25% (it already feels very generous, and don’t get why someone would reject free money)