It seems very strange to me to treat reducing someone’s else chance of X differently to reducing your own (if you’re confident it would affect each of you similarly)! But thank you for engaging with these questions, it’s helping me understand your position better I think.
By ‘collapsing back to expected utility theory’ I only meant that if you consider a large enough reference class of similar decisions, it seems like it will in practice be the same as acting as if you had an extremely low discount threshold? But it sounds like I may just not have understood the original approach well enough.
It seems very strange to me to treat reducing someone’s else chance of X differently to reducing your own (if you’re confident it would affect each of you similarly)! But thank you for engaging with these questions, it’s helping me understand your position better I think.
By ‘collapsing back to expected utility theory’ I only meant that if you consider a large enough reference class of similar decisions, it seems like it will in practice be the same as acting as if you had an extremely low discount threshold? But it sounds like I may just not have understood the original approach well enough.