Well I think there is a big difference between FRI, where the point of view is at the forefront of their work and explicitly stated in research, and MIRI/FHI, where it’s secondary to their main work and is only something which is inferred on the basis of what their researchers happen to believe. Plus as Kaj said you can be a functionalist without being all subjectivist about it.
But Open Phil does seem to have this view now to at least the same extent as FRI does (cf. Muelhauser’s consciousness document).
I think a default assumption should be that works by individual authors don’t necessarily reflect the views of the organization they’re part of. :) Indeed, Luke’s report says this explicitly:
the rest of this report does not necessarily reflect the intuitions and judgments of the Open Philanthropy Project in general. I explain my views in this report merely so they can serve as one input among many as the Open Philanthropy Project considers how to clarify its values and make its grantmaking choices.
Of course, there is nonzero Bayesian evidence in the sense that an organization is unlikely to publish a viewpoint that it finds completely misguided.
When FRI put my consciousness pieces on its site, we were planning to add a counterpart article (I think defending type-F monism or something) to have more balance, but that latter article never got written.
MIRI/FHI have never published anything which talks about any view of consciousness. There is a huge difference between inferring based on things that people happen to write outside of the organization, and the actual research being published by the organization. In the second case, it’s relevant to the research, whether it’s an official value of the organization or not. In the first case, it’s not obvious why it’s relevant at all.
Luke affirmed elsewhere that Open Phil really heavily leans towards his view on consciousness and moral status.
Well I think there is a big difference between FRI, where the point of view is at the forefront of their work and explicitly stated in research, and MIRI/FHI, where it’s secondary to their main work and is only something which is inferred on the basis of what their researchers happen to believe. Plus as Kaj said you can be a functionalist without being all subjectivist about it.
But Open Phil does seem to have this view now to at least the same extent as FRI does (cf. Muelhauser’s consciousness document).
I think a default assumption should be that works by individual authors don’t necessarily reflect the views of the organization they’re part of. :) Indeed, Luke’s report says this explicitly:
Of course, there is nonzero Bayesian evidence in the sense that an organization is unlikely to publish a viewpoint that it finds completely misguided.
When FRI put my consciousness pieces on its site, we were planning to add a counterpart article (I think defending type-F monism or something) to have more balance, but that latter article never got written.
MIRI/FHI have never published anything which talks about any view of consciousness. There is a huge difference between inferring based on things that people happen to write outside of the organization, and the actual research being published by the organization. In the second case, it’s relevant to the research, whether it’s an official value of the organization or not. In the first case, it’s not obvious why it’s relevant at all.
Luke affirmed elsewhere that Open Phil really heavily leans towards his view on consciousness and moral status.