I’m a bit surprised to find that Brian Tomasik attributes his current views on consciousness to his conversations with Carl Shulman, since in my experience Carl is a very careful thinker and the case for accepting anti-realism as the answer to the problem of consciousness seems pretty weak, at least as explained by Brian. I’m very curious to read Carl’s own explanation of his views, if he has written one down. I scanned Carl Shulman’s list of writings but was unable to find anything that addressed this.
I don’t want to put words in Carl’s mouth, and certainly Carl doesn’t necessarily endorse anything I write. Perhaps he’ll chime in. :)
For more defenses of anti-realism (i.e., type-A physicalism), here are some other authors. Dennett is the most famous, though some complain that he doesn’t use rigorous philosophical arguments/jargon.
This may or may not be relevant, but I would definitely say that Brian’s views are not ‘fringe views’ in the philosophy of mind; they’re quite widely held in philosophy and elsewhere. I believe Brian sticks out because his writing is so clear, and because he doesn’t avoid thinking about and admitting strange implications of his views.
That said I don’t know Carl’s specific views on the topic.
I’m a bit surprised to find that Brian Tomasik attributes his current views on consciousness to his conversations with Carl Shulman, since in my experience Carl is a very careful thinker and the case for accepting anti-realism as the answer to the problem of consciousness seems pretty weak, at least as explained by Brian. I’m very curious to read Carl’s own explanation of his views, if he has written one down. I scanned Carl Shulman’s list of writings but was unable to find anything that addressed this.
I don’t want to put words in Carl’s mouth, and certainly Carl doesn’t necessarily endorse anything I write. Perhaps he’ll chime in. :)
For more defenses of anti-realism (i.e., type-A physicalism), here are some other authors. Dennett is the most famous, though some complain that he doesn’t use rigorous philosophical arguments/jargon.
This may or may not be relevant, but I would definitely say that Brian’s views are not ‘fringe views’ in the philosophy of mind; they’re quite widely held in philosophy and elsewhere. I believe Brian sticks out because his writing is so clear, and because he doesn’t avoid thinking about and admitting strange implications of his views.
That said I don’t know Carl’s specific views on the topic.