I think it’s a significant mistake to treat invertebrates as beings having moral worth. I believe that investment of time and energy into this project is not only a waste, but actively misleads people from thinking about and understanding reality. Before any of this discussion, we need to come to an agreement about the empirical facts of the situation.
In examining the nervous systems of invertebrates, we see that there is greatly reduced complexity.
In examining the behavioral activity of invertebrates, we see no evidence of social contracts, empathy, caring.
In the brains of humans, we see large complexes of neurons used for social relations, perception of self, modeling the world in abstract ways, recording and retrieving episodic memories, etc. This is complexity is clearly lacking in invertebrates. This matches the evidence from observing their behavior.
To place moral value on something you have evidence is not a moral agent is morally incorrect. It leads to making trade-offs against actual moral agents in favor of entities without moral value.
Further discussion on this topic should delve into the physiological details of the nervous systems of invertebrates, and observations of their behavior. Without further establishing those details, and exploring why the initial evidence showing that they are not moral agents is incorrect, we must not presume them to be moral agents.
I think it’s a significant mistake to treat invertebrates as beings having moral worth. I believe that investment of time and energy into this project is not only a waste, but actively misleads people from thinking about and understanding reality. Before any of this discussion, we need to come to an agreement about the empirical facts of the situation.
In examining the nervous systems of invertebrates, we see that there is greatly reduced complexity.
In examining the behavioral activity of invertebrates, we see no evidence of social contracts, empathy, caring.
In the brains of humans, we see large complexes of neurons used for social relations, perception of self, modeling the world in abstract ways, recording and retrieving episodic memories, etc. This is complexity is clearly lacking in invertebrates. This matches the evidence from observing their behavior.
To place moral value on something you have evidence is not a moral agent is morally incorrect. It leads to making trade-offs against actual moral agents in favor of entities without moral value.
Further discussion on this topic should delve into the physiological details of the nervous systems of invertebrates, and observations of their behavior. Without further establishing those details, and exploring why the initial evidence showing that they are not moral agents is incorrect, we must not presume them to be moral agents.