There’s value in talking about the non-parallels, but I don’t think that justifies dismissing the analogy as bad. What makes an analogy a good or bad thing?
I don’t think there are any analogies that are so strong that we can lean on them for reasoning-by-analogy, because reasoning by analogy isn’t real reasoning, and generally shouldn’t be done. Real reasoning is when you carry a model with you that has been honed against the stories you have heard, but the models continue to make pretty good predictions even when you’re facing a situation that’s pretty different from any of those stories. Analogical reasoning is when all you carry is a little bag of stories, and then when you need to make a decision, you fish out the story that most resembles the present, and decide as if that story is (somehow) happening exactly all over again.
There really are a lot of people in the real world who reason analogically. It’s possible that Eliezer was partially writing for them, someone has to, but I don’t think he wanted the lesswrong audience (who are ostensibly supposed to be studying good reasoning) to process it in that way.
If it were just Eliezer writing a fanciful story about one possible way things might go, that would be reasonable. But when the story appears to reflect his very strongly held belief about AI unfolding approximately like this {0 warning shots; extremely fast takeoff; near-omnipotent relative to us; automatically malevolent; etc} and when he elsewhere implies that we should be willing to cause nuclear war to enforce his priorities, it starts to sound more sinister.
I don’t think this is really engaging with what I said/should be a reply to my comment.
he elsewhere implies that we should be willing to cause nuclear war to enforce his priorities
Ah, reading that, yeah this wouldn’t be obvious to everyone.
But here’s my view, which I’m fairly sure is also eliezer’s view: If you do something that I credibly consider to be even more threatening than nuclear war (even if you don’t think it is) (as another example: gain of function research), and you refuse to negotiate towards a compromise where you can do the thing in a non-threatening way, so I try to destroy the part of your infrastructure that you’re using to do this, and then you respond to that by escalating to a nuclear exchange, then it is not accurate to say that it was me who caused the nuclear war.
Now, if you think I have a disingenuous reason to treat your activity as threatening even though I know it actually isn’t (which is an accusation people often throw at openai, and it might be true in openai’s case), that you tried to negotiate a safer alternative, but I refused that option, and that I was really essentially just demanding that you cede power, then you could go ahead and escalate to a nuclear exchange and it would be my fault.
But I’ve never seen anyone ever accuse, let alone argue competently, that Eliezer believes those things for disingenuous powerseeking reasons. (I think I’ve seen some tweets that implied that it was a grift for funding his institute, but I honestly don’t know how a person believes that, but even if it were the case, I don’t think Eliezer would consider funding MIRI to be worth nuclear war for him.)
There’s value in talking about the non-parallels, but I don’t think that justifies dismissing the analogy as bad. What makes an analogy a good or bad thing?
I don’t think there are any analogies that are so strong that we can lean on them for reasoning-by-analogy, because reasoning by analogy isn’t real reasoning, and generally shouldn’t be done. Real reasoning is when you carry a model with you that has been honed against the stories you have heard, but the models continue to make pretty good predictions even when you’re facing a situation that’s pretty different from any of those stories. Analogical reasoning is when all you carry is a little bag of stories, and then when you need to make a decision, you fish out the story that most resembles the present, and decide as if that story is (somehow) happening exactly all over again.
There really are a lot of people in the real world who reason analogically. It’s possible that Eliezer was partially writing for them, someone has to, but I don’t think he wanted the lesswrong audience (who are ostensibly supposed to be studying good reasoning) to process it in that way.
If it were just Eliezer writing a fanciful story about one possible way things might go, that would be reasonable. But when the story appears to reflect his very strongly held belief about AI unfolding approximately like this {0 warning shots; extremely fast takeoff; near-omnipotent relative to us; automatically malevolent; etc} and when he elsewhere implies that we should be willing to cause nuclear war to enforce his priorities, it starts to sound more sinister.
I don’t think this is really engaging with what I said/should be a reply to my comment.
Ah, reading that, yeah this wouldn’t be obvious to everyone.
But here’s my view, which I’m fairly sure is also eliezer’s view: If you do something that I credibly consider to be even more threatening than nuclear war (even if you don’t think it is) (as another example: gain of function research), and you refuse to negotiate towards a compromise where you can do the thing in a non-threatening way, so I try to destroy the part of your infrastructure that you’re using to do this, and then you respond to that by escalating to a nuclear exchange, then it is not accurate to say that it was me who caused the nuclear war.
Now, if you think I have a disingenuous reason to treat your activity as threatening even though I know it actually isn’t (which is an accusation people often throw at openai, and it might be true in openai’s case), that you tried to negotiate a safer alternative, but I refused that option, and that I was really essentially just demanding that you cede power, then you could go ahead and escalate to a nuclear exchange and it would be my fault.
But I’ve never seen anyone ever accuse, let alone argue competently, that Eliezer believes those things for disingenuous powerseeking reasons. (I think I’ve seen some tweets that implied that it was a grift for funding his institute, but I honestly don’t know how a person believes that, but even if it were the case, I don’t think Eliezer would consider funding MIRI to be worth nuclear war for him.)