Fair enoughāI think I agree with that. Something that I discuss a lot in my writing is that we clearly have strong moral reasons to do more good rather than less, but that an over-emphasis on āobligationā and ādemandsā can get in the way of people appreciating this. I think Iām basically channeling the same frustration that you have, but rather than denying that there is such a thing as āsupererogationā, I would frame it as emphasizing that we obviously have really good reasons to do supererogatory things, and refusing to do so can even be a straightforward normative error. See, especially, What Permissibility Could Be, where I emphatically reject the ārationalistā conception of permissibility on which we have no more reason to do supererogatory acts than selfish ones.
Fair enoughāI think I agree with that. Something that I discuss a lot in my writing is that we clearly have strong moral reasons to do more good rather than less, but that an over-emphasis on āobligationā and ādemandsā can get in the way of people appreciating this. I think Iām basically channeling the same frustration that you have, but rather than denying that there is such a thing as āsupererogationā, I would frame it as emphasizing that we obviously have really good reasons to do supererogatory things, and refusing to do so can even be a straightforward normative error. See, especially, What Permissibility Could Be, where I emphatically reject the ārationalistā conception of permissibility on which we have no more reason to do supererogatory acts than selfish ones.