The second one is more about the grounds for justification (having warranted beliefs). Maybe judgement calls don’t need to tend to be correct or for there to be the right kind of fit towards calibration for the resulting beliefs to be warranted. Maybe just the fact that something seems a certain way, e.g. even direct intuition about highly speculative things like the far future effects of interventions, can justify belief.
EDIT: This could be consistent with phenomenal conservatism.
Yes, or we don’t need to have any specific reason to believe they do better than random. I think this could be consistent with phenomenal conservatism.
The second one is more about the grounds for justification (having warranted beliefs). Maybe judgement calls don’t need to tend to be correct or for there to be the right kind of fit towards calibration for the resulting beliefs to be warranted. Maybe just the fact that something seems a certain way, e.g. even direct intuition about highly speculative things like the far future effects of interventions, can justify belief.
EDIT: This could be consistent with phenomenal conservatism.
Like maybe your beliefs don’t need to track the truth better than random to be warranted? Fair. I was also implicitly assuming not that.
Yes, or we don’t need to have any specific reason to believe they do better than random. I think this could be consistent with phenomenal conservatism.