I’m not too worried about this kind of moral uncertainty. I think that moral uncertainty is mostly action-relevant when one moral view is particularly ‘grabby’ or the methodology you use to analyse an intervention seems to favour one view over another unfairly.
In both cases, I think the actual reason for concern is quite slippery and difficult for me to articulate well (which normally means that I don’t understand it well). I tend to think that the best policy is to maximise the expected outcomes of the overall decision-making policy (which involves paying attention to decision theory, common sense morality, deontological constraints etc. ).
In any case, most of my moral uncertainty worry comes from maximising very hard on a narrow worldview (or set of metrics) - but I think that “welfarism” is sufficiently broad and the mandate and track record of the EAIF is sufficiently varied that I am not particularly worried about this class of concerns.
I’m not too worried about this kind of moral uncertainty. I think that moral uncertainty is mostly action-relevant when one moral view is particularly ‘grabby’ or the methodology you use to analyse an intervention seems to favour one view over another unfairly.
In both cases, I think the actual reason for concern is quite slippery and difficult for me to articulate well (which normally means that I don’t understand it well). I tend to think that the best policy is to maximise the expected outcomes of the overall decision-making policy (which involves paying attention to decision theory, common sense morality, deontological constraints etc. ).
In any case, most of my moral uncertainty worry comes from maximising very hard on a narrow worldview (or set of metrics) - but I think that “welfarism” is sufficiently broad and the mandate and track record of the EAIF is sufficiently varied that I am not particularly worried about this class of concerns.