Thanks. I take you to say roughly that you have certain core beliefs that youâre unwilling to compromise on, even if you canât justify those beliefs philosophically. And also that you think itâs better to be upfront about that than invent justifications that arenât really load-bearing for you. (Let me know if thatâs a misrepresentation.)
I think itâs virtuous that youâre honest about why you disagree (âI place much lower weight on animalsâ) and I think thatâs valuable for discourse in that it shows where the disagreement lies. I donât have any objection to that. But I also think that saying you just believe that and canât/âwonât justify it (âI cannot give a tight philosophical defence of that view, but I am more committed to it than I am to giving tight philosophical defences of viewsâ) is not particularly valuable for discourse. It doesnât create any opening for productive engagement or movement toward consensus. I donât think itâs harmful exactly, I just think more openness to examining whether the intuition withstands scrutiny would be more valuable.
(That is a question about discourse. I think thereâs also a separate question about the soundness of the decision procedure you described in your original comment. I think itâs unsound, and therefore instrumentally irrational, but Iâm not the rationality police so I wonât get into that.)
Thanks. I take you to say roughly that you have certain core beliefs that youâre unwilling to compromise on, even if you canât justify those beliefs philosophically. And also that you think itâs better to be upfront about that than invent justifications that arenât really load-bearing for you. (Let me know if thatâs a misrepresentation.)
I think itâs virtuous that youâre honest about why you disagree (âI place much lower weight on animalsâ) and I think thatâs valuable for discourse in that it shows where the disagreement lies. I donât have any objection to that. But I also think that saying you just believe that and canât/âwonât justify it (âI cannot give a tight philosophical defence of that view, but I am more committed to it than I am to giving tight philosophical defences of viewsâ) is not particularly valuable for discourse. It doesnât create any opening for productive engagement or movement toward consensus. I donât think itâs harmful exactly, I just think more openness to examining whether the intuition withstands scrutiny would be more valuable.
(That is a question about discourse. I think thereâs also a separate question about the soundness of the decision procedure you described in your original comment. I think itâs unsound, and therefore instrumentally irrational, but Iâm not the rationality police so I wonât get into that.)