I fully endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU) in principle. However, I think it is often good to think about the implications of other moral theories as heuristics to follow ETHU well in practice.
Unless youâre certain about consequentialism, surely you should put some weight on avoiding killing even if it maximises impartial welfare?
I think saving human lives increases the number of beings killed via increasing the number of farmed and wild animals killed.
I agree that thinking about other moral theories is useful for working out what utilitarianism would actually recommend.
Thatâs an interesting point re increasing the total amount of killing, I hadnât considered that! But I was actually picking up on your comment which seemed to say something more generalâthat you wouldnât intrinsically take into account whether an option involved (you) killing people, youâd just look at the consequences (and killing can lead to worse consequences, including in indirect ways, of course).
But it sounds like maybe your response to that is youâre not worried about moral uncertainty /â youâre sure about utilitarianism /â you donât have any reason to avoid killing people, other than the (normally very significant) utilitarian reasons not to kill?
But it sounds like maybe your response to that is youâre not worried about moral uncertainty /â youâre sure about utilitarianism /â you donât have any reason to avoid killing people, other than the (normally very significant) utilitarian reasons not to kill?
Hi Isaac.
I fully endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU) in principle. However, I think it is often good to think about the implications of other moral theories as heuristics to follow ETHU well in practice.
I think saving human lives increases the number of beings killed via increasing the number of farmed and wild animals killed.
Thanks Vasco! :)
I agree that thinking about other moral theories is useful for working out what utilitarianism would actually recommend.
Thatâs an interesting point re increasing the total amount of killing, I hadnât considered that! But I was actually picking up on your comment which seemed to say something more generalâthat you wouldnât intrinsically take into account whether an option involved (you) killing people, youâd just look at the consequences (and killing can lead to worse consequences, including in indirect ways, of course). But it sounds like maybe your response to that is youâre not worried about moral uncertainty /â youâre sure about utilitarianism /â you donât have any reason to avoid killing people, other than the (normally very significant) utilitarian reasons not to kill?
Yes.