But why stop at farmed animals? What about wild animals, especially insects? What about the long-term future?
As you said, I strongly endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism, so I do think one should consider effects across all time, space and beings. One reason I prefer interventions improving the conditions of farmed animals instead of ones reducing their consumption is that the former have smaller effects on wild animals. Another is that, although I think reducing the consumption of farmed animals is beneficial nearterm (next few years) because farmed animals have negative lives now, it may be harmful longer term (next few decades) if it is sufficiently permanent because farmed animals’ lives may become positive.
It is super unclear whether wild animals have positive or negative lives, which means the expected impact on them is lower than it would otherwise be if one could more confidently say they are positive or negative. I believe it is way clearer, although not totally clear, that farmed chickens and shrimp in standard conditions have negative lives, because there is data on the time they spend in pain (which I used in my post), which is not the case for the lives of wild arthropods (the most relevant group to assess the effects on wild animals). For chickens in improved conditions, I would say there is room for disagreement about whether they have positive or negative lives.
My background understanding is that population increase leads to cultivation of land for farming and reduces wild animal populations and so wild animal suffering quite a bit.
Relatedly, I estimated the effects on wild animals of saving human lives in a random country of the beneficiaries of GiveWell’s top charities are 1.15 k times as large as the effects on humans. I welcome estimates for the effects on wild animals of interventions improving the conditions of farmed animals, and I am open to changing my prioritisation based on the results.
By contrast, if your genuine goal is to pick an intervention with no plausible chance of causing significant harm, and you are being honest with yourself about possible backfires, you will do nothing.
I think acting with the goal of trying to decrease the chance of harm reduces this in expectation relative to the counterfactual of doing nothing.
Thanks, Alex.
As you said, I strongly endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism, so I do think one should consider effects across all time, space and beings. One reason I prefer interventions improving the conditions of farmed animals instead of ones reducing their consumption is that the former have smaller effects on wild animals. Another is that, although I think reducing the consumption of farmed animals is beneficial nearterm (next few years) because farmed animals have negative lives now, it may be harmful longer term (next few decades) if it is sufficiently permanent because farmed animals’ lives may become positive.
It is super unclear whether wild animals have positive or negative lives, which means the expected impact on them is lower than it would otherwise be if one could more confidently say they are positive or negative. I believe it is way clearer, although not totally clear, that farmed chickens and shrimp in standard conditions have negative lives, because there is data on the time they spend in pain (which I used in my post), which is not the case for the lives of wild arthropods (the most relevant group to assess the effects on wild animals). For chickens in improved conditions, I would say there is room for disagreement about whether they have positive or negative lives.
Relatedly, I estimated the effects on wild animals of saving human lives in a random country of the beneficiaries of GiveWell’s top charities are 1.15 k times as large as the effects on humans. I welcome estimates for the effects on wild animals of interventions improving the conditions of farmed animals, and I am open to changing my prioritisation based on the results.
I think acting with the goal of trying to decrease the chance of harm reduces this in expectation relative to the counterfactual of doing nothing.