It wasn’t my intention to throw out random objections to make you respond to them. I don’t take seriously any of the claims I offered in the first paragraph.
I think valuing animal welfare as highly as I do implies saving lives in many countries is harmful nearterm, but the overall effect may well be beneficial or harmful (not just harmful).
I would axiomatically reject the former position in addition to the latter, so this distinction doesn’t matter to me.
I do not see how AIM being beneficial overall justifies them starting organisations which may well be causing lots of harm nearterm.
In the worlds where animals have low moral weight, their GHD work is very positive. In the world where animals have high moral weight, their AW work is very positive. The portfolio approach is a way to maximize expected utility under risk aversion. This point is made here and I elaborate more in replies.
In the worlds where animals have low moral weight, their GHD work is very positive. In the world where animals have high moral weight, their AW work is very positive. The portfolio approach is a way to maximize expected utility under risk aversion. This point is made here and I elaborate more in replies.
The portfolio approach should be considered across the whole world, not AIM. There are already lots of efforts to help humans, so I have a hard time seeing how the optimal global portfolio involves AIM incubating many organisations which help humans, but may easily be causing lots of harm nearterm.
I assume your argument also depends on the type of risk aversion. I think improving the conditions of farmed animals has a much lower chance of being harmful than saving human lives.
I reject risk aversion with respect to impartial welfare (although it makes all sense to be risk averse with respect to money) because it implies rejecting self-evident principles.
It wasn’t my intention to throw out random objections to make you respond to them. I don’t take seriously any of the claims I offered in the first paragraph.
I would axiomatically reject the former position in addition to the latter, so this distinction doesn’t matter to me.
In the worlds where animals have low moral weight, their GHD work is very positive. In the world where animals have high moral weight, their AW work is very positive. The portfolio approach is a way to maximize expected utility under risk aversion. This point is made here and I elaborate more in replies.
The portfolio approach should be considered across the whole world, not AIM. There are already lots of efforts to help humans, so I have a hard time seeing how the optimal global portfolio involves AIM incubating many organisations which help humans, but may easily be causing lots of harm nearterm.
I assume your argument also depends on the type of risk aversion. I think improving the conditions of farmed animals has a much lower chance of being harmful than saving human lives.
I reject risk aversion with respect to impartial welfare (although it makes all sense to be risk averse with respect to money) because it implies rejecting self-evident principles.