Looking back at this now, I don’t really get the original setup, either:
Let the amount of enjoyment E and suffering S both be functions of the associated costs CE and CS. If for each success, we have n failures, the maximization of E(CE)+S(CS) subject to CE+nCS=constant, gives the following first-order condition (...)
CE+nCS=constant reflects the costs associated with enjoyment and suffering for the average individual (after multiplying by n+1), where CE and CS are the costs of the individual instances. But why are we maximizing E(CE)+S(CS)? The average individual faces n instances of S(CS) for each of E(CE), so should we maximize E(CE)+nS(CS) instead and then look at E(CE)−nS(CS)? Or something else?
I’m also not convinced that the hedonic functions of costs should be concave, either, and my intuition is that this doesn’t hold at the extremes of suffering, which take all of an individual’s attention and priority.
It’s also assumed that animals who die without having offspring have net negative lives, while those who do have offspring have net positive lives, but neither seems obvious to me, since you can imagine animals who die without having offspring but have long and decent (although plausibly worse) lives nevertheless, e.g. individuals lower in the status hierarchy of their group.
I don’t have a strong view on the original setup, but I can clarify what the argument is. For the first point, that we maximize E(CE)+S(CS). The idea is that we want to maximize the likelihood that the organism chooses the action that leads to enjoyment (the one being selected for). That probability is a function of how much better it is to choose that action than the alternative. So if you get E from choosing that action and lose S from choosing the alternative, the benefit from choosing that action is E - (-S) = E + S. However, you only pay to produce the experience of the action you actually take. This last reason is why the costs are weighted by probability, while the benefits, which are only about the anticipation of the experience you would get conditional on your action, are not.
It occurs to me that a fuller model might endogenize n, i.e. be something like max P(E(C_E) + S(C_S)) s.t. P(.) C_E + (1 - P(.)) C_S = M. (Replacing n with 1 - P here so it’s a rate, not a level. Also, perhaps this reduces to the same thing based on the envelope theorem.)
And on the last point, that point is relevant for the interpretation of the model (e.g. choosing the value of n), but it is not an assumption of the model.
Looking back at this now, I don’t really get the original setup, either:
CE+nCS=constant reflects the costs associated with enjoyment and suffering for the average individual (after multiplying by n+1), where CE and CS are the costs of the individual instances. But why are we maximizing E(CE)+S(CS)? The average individual faces n instances of S(CS) for each of E(CE), so should we maximize E(CE)+nS(CS) instead and then look at E(CE)−nS(CS)? Or something else?
I’m also not convinced that the hedonic functions of costs should be concave, either, and my intuition is that this doesn’t hold at the extremes of suffering, which take all of an individual’s attention and priority.
It’s also assumed that animals who die without having offspring have net negative lives, while those who do have offspring have net positive lives, but neither seems obvious to me, since you can imagine animals who die without having offspring but have long and decent (although plausibly worse) lives nevertheless, e.g. individuals lower in the status hierarchy of their group.
I don’t have a strong view on the original setup, but I can clarify what the argument is. For the first point, that we maximize E(CE)+S(CS). The idea is that we want to maximize the likelihood that the organism chooses the action that leads to enjoyment (the one being selected for). That probability is a function of how much better it is to choose that action than the alternative. So if you get E from choosing that action and lose S from choosing the alternative, the benefit from choosing that action is E - (-S) = E + S. However, you only pay to produce the experience of the action you actually take. This last reason is why the costs are weighted by probability, while the benefits, which are only about the anticipation of the experience you would get conditional on your action, are not.
It occurs to me that a fuller model might endogenize n, i.e. be something like max P(E(C_E) + S(C_S)) s.t. P(.) C_E + (1 - P(.)) C_S = M. (Replacing n with 1 - P here so it’s a rate, not a level. Also, perhaps this reduces to the same thing based on the envelope theorem.)
And on the last point, that point is relevant for the interpretation of the model (e.g. choosing the value of n), but it is not an assumption of the model.