Thanks, yeah, I remember liking that paper. Though Iâm inclined to think you should assign (precise) higher-order probabilities to the various âadmissible probability functionsâ, from which you can derive a kind of higher-order expected value verdict, which helpfully seems to avoid the problems afaict?
General lesson: if we donât have any good way of dealing with imprecise credences, we probably shouldnât regard them as rationally mandatory. Especially since the case for thinking that we must have imprecise credences (i.e., that any kind of precision is necessarily irrational) seems kind of weak.
General lesson: if we donât have any good way of dealing with imprecise credences, we probably shouldnât regard them as rationally mandatory.
I worry that this is motivated reasoning. Should what we can justifiably believe will happen as a consequence of our actions depend on whether it results in satisfactory moral consequences (e.g. avoiding paralysis)?
Thanks, yeah, I remember liking that paper. Though Iâm inclined to think you should assign (precise) higher-order probabilities to the various âadmissible probability functionsâ, from which you can derive a kind of higher-order expected value verdict, which helpfully seems to avoid the problems afaict?
General lesson: if we donât have any good way of dealing with imprecise credences, we probably shouldnât regard them as rationally mandatory. Especially since the case for thinking that we must have imprecise credences (i.e., that any kind of precision is necessarily irrational) seems kind of weak.
I worry that this is motivated reasoning. Should what we can justifiably believe will happen as a consequence of our actions depend on whether it results in satisfactory moral consequences (e.g. avoiding paralysis)?