Executive summary: The author, broadly supportive of Effective Altruism, argues that strict impartial hedonistic utilitarianism risks absurd or alienating conclusions and proposes a partial, multi-circle ethics that prioritizes humans (and possibly sentient AIs) while still caring about animals, grounding value in flourishing as well as pleasure.
Key points:
The author endorses EA practices (e.g., donations, longtermism, AI risk) but is unconvinced by some forms of utilitarianism, especially pure hedonistic versions.
They argue that reasoning which treats wild invertebrate welfare as overwhelmingly dominant can be a rationalization and may lead to unacceptable conclusions.
They propose “moral circles” that prioritize humans in the innermost circle (and sentient AIs if/when applicable), then farm animals, then wild animals, while affirming concern for all.
The author claims partiality grounded in love, loyalty, reciprocity, social contracts, and fairness can be ethically relevant alongside consequences.
They suggest valuing flourishing (skills, health, meaning, art) in addition to pleasure and pain, contending this supports prioritizing humans without dismissing animal flourishing.
For practical giving, they recommend serious, non-negotiable commitments (e.g., a 10% pledge) go first to human charities and existential risk reduction, with additional giving to animals as desired, while noting this approach has the downside of potentially neglecting outer circles too long.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, andcontact us if you have feedback.
Executive summary: The author, broadly supportive of Effective Altruism, argues that strict impartial hedonistic utilitarianism risks absurd or alienating conclusions and proposes a partial, multi-circle ethics that prioritizes humans (and possibly sentient AIs) while still caring about animals, grounding value in flourishing as well as pleasure.
Key points:
The author endorses EA practices (e.g., donations, longtermism, AI risk) but is unconvinced by some forms of utilitarianism, especially pure hedonistic versions.
They argue that reasoning which treats wild invertebrate welfare as overwhelmingly dominant can be a rationalization and may lead to unacceptable conclusions.
They propose “moral circles” that prioritize humans in the innermost circle (and sentient AIs if/when applicable), then farm animals, then wild animals, while affirming concern for all.
The author claims partiality grounded in love, loyalty, reciprocity, social contracts, and fairness can be ethically relevant alongside consequences.
They suggest valuing flourishing (skills, health, meaning, art) in addition to pleasure and pain, contending this supports prioritizing humans without dismissing animal flourishing.
For practical giving, they recommend serious, non-negotiable commitments (e.g., a 10% pledge) go first to human charities and existential risk reduction, with additional giving to animals as desired, while noting this approach has the downside of potentially neglecting outer circles too long.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.