Executive summary: The author argues that dismissing longtermism and intergenerational justice due to its association with controversial figures or philosophical frameworks is misguided, and that caring about future generations is both reasonable and morally important regardless of one’s stance on utilitarianism or population ethics.
Key points:
Critics on the political left, such as Nathan J. Robinson and Émile P. Torres, oppose longtermism so strongly that they express indifference to human extinction, which the author finds deeply misguided and anti-human.
The author defends the moral significance of preserving humanity, citing the value of human relationships, knowledge, consciousness, and potential.
While longtermism is often tied to utilitarianism and the total view of population ethics, caring about the future doesn’t require accepting these theories; even person-affecting or present-focused views support concern for future generations.
Common critiques of utilitarianism rely on unrealistic thought experiments; in practice, these moral theories do not compel abhorrent actions when all else is considered.
Philosophical debates (e.g. about population ethics) should not obscure the intuitive and practical importance of ensuring a flourishing future for humanity.
The author warns against negative polarisation—rejecting longtermist ideas solely because of their association with disliked figures or ideologies—and urges readers to separate intergenerational ethics from such baggage.
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Executive summary: The author argues that dismissing longtermism and intergenerational justice due to its association with controversial figures or philosophical frameworks is misguided, and that caring about future generations is both reasonable and morally important regardless of one’s stance on utilitarianism or population ethics.
Key points:
Critics on the political left, such as Nathan J. Robinson and Émile P. Torres, oppose longtermism so strongly that they express indifference to human extinction, which the author finds deeply misguided and anti-human.
The author defends the moral significance of preserving humanity, citing the value of human relationships, knowledge, consciousness, and potential.
While longtermism is often tied to utilitarianism and the total view of population ethics, caring about the future doesn’t require accepting these theories; even person-affecting or present-focused views support concern for future generations.
Common critiques of utilitarianism rely on unrealistic thought experiments; in practice, these moral theories do not compel abhorrent actions when all else is considered.
Philosophical debates (e.g. about population ethics) should not obscure the intuitive and practical importance of ensuring a flourishing future for humanity.
The author warns against negative polarisation—rejecting longtermist ideas solely because of their association with disliked figures or ideologies—and urges readers to separate intergenerational ethics from such baggage.
This comment was auto-generated by the EA Forum Team. Feel free to point out issues with this summary by replying to the comment, and contact us if you have feedback.