That’s fair. I tend to think of intergenerational justice as synonymous with a weak form of longtermism, although perhaps ‘longtermism’ is too loaded a term (I’m thinking of a bare bones version of “Future generations are worthy of moral consideration”).
I also agree there are reasonable critiques of (stronger forms of) longtermism. I wouldn’t call myself a strong longtermist personally, so I suppose I should’ve been clearer that I’m not making a positive argument for any particular form of longtermism. Rather, my goal is to respond to what I see as some fairly extreme and flat-footed responses to weak longtermism.
I think it would be helpful to not use longtermism in this synonymous way because I think it’s prone to lead to misunderstandings and unproductive conflict.
For example, there is a school of thought called the person affecting view, which denies that future, non-existing people have moral patient hood but would still be able to have reasonable discussions about intergenerational justice in the sense of children might want to have children, etc.
In general, I wouldn’t characterize those views as any more or less extreme or flat-footed than weak forms of longtermism. I think these are difficult topics that are contentious by nature.
For me, the key is to stay open-minded and seek some form of discursive resolution that allows us to move forward in a constructive and ideally for all acceptable way. (That’s a critical pragmatist stance inspired by discourse ethics)
This is why I appreciate your curiosity and willingness to engage with different perspectives, even if it’s sometimes hard to understand opposing viewpoints. Keep at it! :)
That’s fair. I tend to think of intergenerational justice as synonymous with a weak form of longtermism, although perhaps ‘longtermism’ is too loaded a term (I’m thinking of a bare bones version of “Future generations are worthy of moral consideration”).
I also agree there are reasonable critiques of (stronger forms of) longtermism. I wouldn’t call myself a strong longtermist personally, so I suppose I should’ve been clearer that I’m not making a positive argument for any particular form of longtermism. Rather, my goal is to respond to what I see as some fairly extreme and flat-footed responses to weak longtermism.
I think it would be helpful to not use longtermism in this synonymous way because I think it’s prone to lead to misunderstandings and unproductive conflict.
For example, there is a school of thought called the person affecting view, which denies that future, non-existing people have moral patient hood but would still be able to have reasonable discussions about intergenerational justice in the sense of children might want to have children, etc.
In general, I wouldn’t characterize those views as any more or less extreme or flat-footed than weak forms of longtermism. I think these are difficult topics that are contentious by nature.
For me, the key is to stay open-minded and seek some form of discursive resolution that allows us to move forward in a constructive and ideally for all acceptable way. (That’s a critical pragmatist stance inspired by discourse ethics)
This is why I appreciate your curiosity and willingness to engage with different perspectives, even if it’s sometimes hard to understand opposing viewpoints. Keep at it! :)