According to Eliezer, in the cog sci literature people don’t systematically undercorrect for biases like overconfidence when warned to avoid them. Rather, they’re systematically miscalibrated about whether they’re overcorrecting or undercorrecting. (“Yes, I know, I was surprised too.”)
If our cure for moderate cases of overconfidence tends to produce extreme underconfidence, then we can be left worse off that we were originally, especially if there are community norms punishing people more for sounding overconfident than for sounding underconfident.
According to Eliezer, in the cog sci literature people don’t systematically undercorrect for biases like overconfidence when warned to avoid them. Rather, they’re systematically miscalibrated about whether they’re overcorrecting or undercorrecting. (“Yes, I know, I was surprised too.”)
If our cure for moderate cases of overconfidence tends to produce extreme underconfidence, then we can be left worse off that we were originally, especially if there are community norms punishing people more for sounding overconfident than for sounding underconfident.