even if our abstract utility functions don’t say they matter any less just because other things matter more
A utility function can’t say anything else, in decision theory. Total caring is, roughly speaking, conserved.
The psuedo utility functions that a hedonic utilitarian projects onto others can introduce more caring for one thing without reducing their caring for other things, but they’re irrelevant in this context. (and if you ask me, a preference utilitarian, they’re not very relevant in the context of utilitarianism either, but never mind that.)
A utility function can’t say anything else, in decision theory. Total caring is, roughly speaking, conserved.
The psuedo utility functions that a hedonic utilitarian projects onto others can introduce more caring for one thing without reducing their caring for other things, but they’re irrelevant in this context. (and if you ask me, a preference utilitarian, they’re not very relevant in the context of utilitarianism either, but never mind that.)