They don’t become less bad, but we pay less attention and devote fewer resources to them, which is a very plausible way of interpreting “caring less”.
One meaning of “caring” (let’s call it Caring-1) is the kind of care a parent provides for their child. This is precisely the type of care you’re talking about here. It implies a responsibility to nurture, protect, and feel for and individual person, place, or thing. Common sense is that we have a responsibility to care for a very limited number of others in this way, and to at least be cognizant enough to do no harm to a much wider circle of others.
“Caring” can also refer to one’s receptivity to “chance encounters with other people’s problems.” Let’s call this Caring-2.
If you had a golden opportunity to help out with a certain problem, would you (“Do you want a hand with that”)?
Do you approve of the fact that somebody out there is working on a certain problem (“X is doing amazing work on this problem!”)?
Do you feel and express sympathy for a certain problem when it is brought to your attention (“I’m so sorry”)?
Do you acknowledge the reality of the suffering various problems cause, even if you don’t personally work on that problem yourself (“that is a really serious issue”)?
Will you acknowledge that the problem seem like a plausible choice for extending Caring-1, even if you don’t personally choose to do so (“somebody should do somethign!”)?
Nobody can provide Caring-1 to every issue. The difference between short-termists and longtermists is to what sorts of issues they extend or reject Caring-2.
Longtermists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for major present-day issues (famines, floods, etc), in favor of extending either Caring-1 or Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste).
Short-termists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste) in order to focus more on present-day issues (famines and floods).
Hossenfelder expresses around 14:45 that she approves of extending Caring-2 to both the short-term and long-term future. What bothers her is the idea that we should extend no caring-2 or caring-1 to the present day, as well as some of the more far-out ideas longtermist thinkers have explored (i.e. simulation arguments).
Of course, Hossenfelder, a theoretical physicist, is smart enough to make this distinction herself. The fact that she chooses not to, and couches her argument in such heated language, says to me that this is just another crude political hit-job.
One meaning of “caring” (let’s call it Caring-1) is the kind of care a parent provides for their child. This is precisely the type of care you’re talking about here. It implies a responsibility to nurture, protect, and feel for and individual person, place, or thing. Common sense is that we have a responsibility to care for a very limited number of others in this way, and to at least be cognizant enough to do no harm to a much wider circle of others.
“Caring” can also refer to one’s receptivity to “chance encounters with other people’s problems.” Let’s call this Caring-2.
If you had a golden opportunity to help out with a certain problem, would you (“Do you want a hand with that”)?
Do you approve of the fact that somebody out there is working on a certain problem (“X is doing amazing work on this problem!”)?
Do you feel and express sympathy for a certain problem when it is brought to your attention (“I’m so sorry”)?
Do you acknowledge the reality of the suffering various problems cause, even if you don’t personally work on that problem yourself (“that is a really serious issue”)?
Will you acknowledge that the problem seem like a plausible choice for extending Caring-1, even if you don’t personally choose to do so (“somebody should do somethign!”)?
Nobody can provide Caring-1 to every issue. The difference between short-termists and longtermists is to what sorts of issues they extend or reject Caring-2.
Longtermists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for major present-day issues (famines, floods, etc), in favor of extending either Caring-1 or Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste).
Short-termists may reject or downplay Caring-2 for far-future issues (astronomical waste) in order to focus more on present-day issues (famines and floods).
Hossenfelder expresses around 14:45 that she approves of extending Caring-2 to both the short-term and long-term future. What bothers her is the idea that we should extend no caring-2 or caring-1 to the present day, as well as some of the more far-out ideas longtermist thinkers have explored (i.e. simulation arguments).
Of course, Hossenfelder, a theoretical physicist, is smart enough to make this distinction herself. The fact that she chooses not to, and couches her argument in such heated language, says to me that this is just another crude political hit-job.