Instead Iām saying that in many decision-situations people find themselves in, although they could (somewhat) narrow their credence range by investing more thought, in practice the returns from doing that thinking arenāt enough to justify it, so they shouldnāt do the thinking.
(I donāt think this is particularly important, you can feel free to prioritize my other comment.) Right, sorry, I understood that part. I was asking about an implication of this view. Suppose you have an intervention whose sign varies over the range of your indeterminate credences. Per the standard decision theory for indeterminate credences, then, you currently donāt have a reason to do the intervention ā itās not determinately better than inaction. (Iāll say more about this below, re: your digits of pi example.) So if by āthe returns from doing that thinking arenāt enough to justify itā you mean you should just do the intervention in such a case, that doesnāt make sense to me.
(I donāt think this is particularly important, you can feel free to prioritize my other comment.) Right, sorry, I understood that part. I was asking about an implication of this view. Suppose you have an intervention whose sign varies over the range of your indeterminate credences. Per the standard decision theory for indeterminate credences, then, you currently donāt have a reason to do the intervention ā itās not determinately better than inaction. (Iāll say more about this below, re: your digits of pi example.) So if by āthe returns from doing that thinking arenāt enough to justify itā you mean you should just do the intervention in such a case, that doesnāt make sense to me.