I think it’s quite sensible that people hoping to have a positive impact in biosecurity should become well-informed first. However, I don’t think this necessarily means that radical positions that would ban a lot of research are necessarily wrong, even if they are more often supported by people with less detailed knowledge of the field. I’m not accusing you of saying this, I just want to separate the two issues.
Many professionals in this space are scared and stressed. Adding to that isn’t necessarily building trust and needed allies. The professionals in this space are good people – no reputable virologist is trying to do research that intentionally releases or contributes to a pandemic. Biosafety professionals spend their life working to prevent lab leaks. If I’m being honest, many professionals in and around the biosecurity field don’t think incredibly highly of recent (the past few years) journalistic efforts and calls for total research bans.
Many people calling for complete bans think that scientists are unreliable on this—because they want to continue to do their work, and may not be experts in risk—and the fact that said scientists do not like people doing this doesn’t establish that anyone calling for a complete ban is wrong to do so.
As a case in point regarding the unreliability of involved scientists: your reference number 6 repeatedly states that there is “no evidence for a laboratory origin of SARS-CoV-2”, while citing arguments around the location of initial cases and phylogeny of SARS-CoV-2 as evidence for a zoonotic emergence. However, a survey of BSL-3 facilities in China found that 53% of associated coronavirus-related Nature publications were produced by Wuhan-based labs between 2017 and 2019, and it is extremely implausible that Wuhan bears 50% of the risk for novel zoonotic virus emergence in all of China! (it’s possible that the authors of that survey erred—the do seem ideologically committed to the lab leak theory). Furthermore, I have to the best of my ability evaluated arguments about the presence of the furin cleavage site in the SARS-CoV-2 genome and my conclusion is that it is around 5 times as likely to be present in the lab origin scenario (accounting the fact that the WIV is an author on a proposal to insert such sites into SARS-like coronaviruses; also, I consider anywhere from 1.1 to 20 times as likely to be plausible). One can debate the relative strength of different pieces of evidence—and many have—but the claim that there is evidence on one side and none on the other is not plausible in my view, and I at least don’t trust anyone making such a claim is able to capably adjudicate questions about risks of certain kinds of pathogen research.
(not that it’s especially relevant, but I currently think the case for zoonosis is slightly stronger than the case for a lab leak, I just don’t think you can credibly claim that there’s no evidence that supports the lab leak theory)
A little bit of proof reading
stating confidentiality
confidently
You don’t likely don’t know more than professionals
Thanks! I do broadly agree with your points. I linked reference 6 as an example of the benefits and nuances of dual-use research, but don’t / shouldn’t comment on COVID-19 origins and their views expressed on it.
I think it’s quite sensible that people hoping to have a positive impact in biosecurity should become well-informed first. However, I don’t think this necessarily means that radical positions that would ban a lot of research are necessarily wrong, even if they are more often supported by people with less detailed knowledge of the field. I’m not accusing you of saying this, I just want to separate the two issues.
Many people calling for complete bans think that scientists are unreliable on this—because they want to continue to do their work, and may not be experts in risk—and the fact that said scientists do not like people doing this doesn’t establish that anyone calling for a complete ban is wrong to do so.
As a case in point regarding the unreliability of involved scientists: your reference number 6 repeatedly states that there is “no evidence for a laboratory origin of SARS-CoV-2”, while citing arguments around the location of initial cases and phylogeny of SARS-CoV-2 as evidence for a zoonotic emergence. However, a survey of BSL-3 facilities in China found that 53% of associated coronavirus-related Nature publications were produced by Wuhan-based labs between 2017 and 2019, and it is extremely implausible that Wuhan bears 50% of the risk for novel zoonotic virus emergence in all of China! (it’s possible that the authors of that survey erred—the do seem ideologically committed to the lab leak theory). Furthermore, I have to the best of my ability evaluated arguments about the presence of the furin cleavage site in the SARS-CoV-2 genome and my conclusion is that it is around 5 times as likely to be present in the lab origin scenario (accounting the fact that the WIV is an author on a proposal to insert such sites into SARS-like coronaviruses; also, I consider anywhere from 1.1 to 20 times as likely to be plausible). One can debate the relative strength of different pieces of evidence—and many have—but the claim that there is evidence on one side and none on the other is not plausible in my view, and I at least don’t trust anyone making such a claim is able to capably adjudicate questions about risks of certain kinds of pathogen research.
(not that it’s especially relevant, but I currently think the case for zoonosis is slightly stronger than the case for a lab leak, I just don’t think you can credibly claim that there’s no evidence that supports the lab leak theory)
A little bit of proof reading
confidently
You likely don’t know
Thanks! I do broadly agree with your points. I linked reference 6 as an example of the benefits and nuances of dual-use research, but don’t / shouldn’t comment on COVID-19 origins and their views expressed on it.