There are a ton of judgement calls in coming up with moral weights. Iâm worried about a dynamic where the people most interested in getting deep into these questions are people who already intuitively care pretty strongly about animals, and so the best weights available end up pretty biased
There are a ton of judgement calls in coming up with moral weights.Iâm worried about a dynamic where the people most interested in getting deep into these questions are people who already intuitively care pretty strongly about animals, and so the best weights available end up pretty biased
I agree thereâs such a problem. But I think it is important to also point out that there is the same problem for people who tend to think they âdo not make judgement calls about moral weightsâ, but have nonetheless effectively came up with their own judgement calls when they live their daily lives which âby the wayâ affect animals (eat animals, live in buildings that require constructions that kill millions of animals, gardening, which harms and give rise to many animals, etc).
Also, I think it is equally, maybe more, important to recognize those people who make such judgement calls without explicitly thinking about moral weights, let alone go into tedious research projects, are people who intuitively care pretty little about animals, and so their âeffective intuition about moral weightsâ (intuitive because they didnât want to use research to back it up) backing up their actions end up pretty biased.
I think I intuitively worry about the bias of those who do not particularly feel strongly about animalsâ suffering (even those caused by them), than the bias of those who care pretty strongly about animals. And of course, disclaimer: I think I lie within the latter group.
Sure! Iâd love to see a group of people who donât start out caring about animals much more than average try to tackle this research problem. And then maybe an adversarial collaboration?
Ah, interesting! I like both the terminology and and idea of âadversarial collaborationâ. For instance, I think incorporating debates into this research might actually move us closer to the truth.
But I am also wary that if we use a classical way of deciding who wins debate, the losing side would aljmost always be the group who assigned higher (even just slightly higher than average) âmoral weightsâ to animals (not relative to humans, but relative to the debate opponent). So I think maybe if we use debate as a way to push closer to the truth, we probably use the classical ways of deciding debates.
Iâm concerned about that dynamic too and think itâs important to keep in mind, especially in the general case of researchersâ intuitions tending to bias their work, even when attempting objectivity. However, Iâm also concerned about the dismissal of results like RPâs welfare ranges on the basis of speculation about the researchersâ priors and/âor the counterintuitive conclusions, rather than on the merits of the analyses themselves.
I think the judgement calls used in coming up with moral weights have less to do with caring about animals and more to do with how much you think attributes like intelligence and self-awareness have to do with sentience. Theyâre applied to animals, but I think theyâre really more neuroscience/âphilosophy intuitions. The people who have the strongest/âmost out-of-the-ordinary intuitions are MIRI folk, not animal lovers.
There are a ton of judgement calls in coming up with moral weights. Iâm worried about a dynamic where the people most interested in getting deep into these questions are people who already intuitively care pretty strongly about animals, and so the best weights available end up pretty biased
I agree thereâs such a problem. But I think it is important to also point out that there is the same problem for people who tend to think they âdo not make judgement calls about moral weightsâ, but have nonetheless effectively came up with their own judgement calls when they live their daily lives which âby the wayâ affect animals (eat animals, live in buildings that require constructions that kill millions of animals, gardening, which harms and give rise to many animals, etc).
Also, I think it is equally, maybe more, important to recognize those people who make such judgement calls without explicitly thinking about moral weights, let alone go into tedious research projects, are people who intuitively care pretty little about animals, and so their âeffective intuition about moral weightsâ (intuitive because they didnât want to use research to back it up) backing up their actions end up pretty biased.
I think I intuitively worry about the bias of those who do not particularly feel strongly about animalsâ suffering (even those caused by them), than the bias of those who care pretty strongly about animals. And of course, disclaimer: I think I lie within the latter group.
Sure! Iâd love to see a group of people who donât start out caring about animals much more than average try to tackle this research problem. And then maybe an adversarial collaboration?
I just wrote up more on this here: Weighing Animal Worth.
Ah, interesting! I like both the terminology and and idea of âadversarial collaborationâ. For instance, I think incorporating debates into this research might actually move us closer to the truth.
But I am also wary that if we use a classical way of deciding who wins debate, the losing side would aljmost always be the group who assigned higher (even just slightly higher than average) âmoral weightsâ to animals (not relative to humans, but relative to the debate opponent). So I think maybe if we use debate as a way to push closer to the truth, we probably use the classical ways of deciding debates.
Can you say more about what you mean by that?
Iâm concerned about that dynamic too and think itâs important to keep in mind, especially in the general case of researchersâ intuitions tending to bias their work, even when attempting objectivity. However, Iâm also concerned about the dismissal of results like RPâs welfare ranges on the basis of speculation about the researchersâ priors and/âor the counterintuitive conclusions, rather than on the merits of the analyses themselves.
I think the judgement calls used in coming up with moral weights have less to do with caring about animals and more to do with how much you think attributes like intelligence and self-awareness have to do with sentience. Theyâre applied to animals, but I think theyâre really more neuroscience/âphilosophy intuitions. The people who have the strongest/âmost out-of-the-ordinary intuitions are MIRI folk, not animal lovers.