Because of Evan’s comment, I think that the signaling consideration here is another example of the following pattern:
Someone suggests we stop (or limit) doing X because of what we might signal by doing X, even though we think X is correct. But this person is somewhat blind to the negative signaling effects of not living up to our own stated ideals (i.e. having integrity). It turns out that some more rationalist-type people report that they would be put off by this lack of honesty and integrity (speculation: perhaps because these types have an automatic norm of honesty).
The other primary example of this I can think of is with veganism and the signaling benefits (and usually unrecongnized costs).
A solution is that when you find yourself saying “X will put off audience Y” to ask yourself “but what audience does X help attract, and who is put off by my alternative to X?”
Because of Evan’s comment, I think that the signaling consideration here is another example of the following pattern:
Someone suggests we stop (or limit) doing X because of what we might signal by doing X, even though we think X is correct. But this person is somewhat blind to the negative signaling effects of not living up to our own stated ideals (i.e. having integrity). It turns out that some more rationalist-type people report that they would be put off by this lack of honesty and integrity (speculation: perhaps because these types have an automatic norm of honesty).
The other primary example of this I can think of is with veganism and the signaling benefits (and usually unrecongnized costs).
A solution is that when you find yourself saying “X will put off audience Y” to ask yourself “but what audience does X help attract, and who is put off by my alternative to X?”