normative properties that arenāt further explained physically
Youāve misunderstood Rawlette here. Her viewāanalytic hedonismāholds that normative properties are analytically reducible to pleasure and suffering. So her suggestion here is not that we need metaphysically primitive normative properties to explain the experience. Quite the opposite! Itās rather (as I understand it) that the normativity ācomes along for freeā (so to speak) with the familiar felt nature of the experience.
āIn the end, you realize that the only way to describe the one is to say that itās āgoodā or āpositiveā, and that you can only describe the other by saying itās ābadā or ānegativeā. ā
Was this not a motivating example for her view? Or just proposed as an example where the descriptive and normative may overlap?
Does she have a specific descriptive definition of pleasure sheās working with that doesnāt directly use normative terms but from which she can derive its normative goodness? (I donāt expect a persuasive solution to the is-ought problem; at some point you need to assume a normative fact to obtain any further ones, and I think we could prove this formally.)
Youāve misunderstood Rawlette here. Her viewāanalytic hedonismāholds that normative properties are analytically reducible to pleasure and suffering. So her suggestion here is not that we need metaphysically primitive normative properties to explain the experience. Quite the opposite! Itās rather (as I understand it) that the normativity ācomes along for freeā (so to speak) with the familiar felt nature of the experience.
Iām not sure how to interpret this, then:
āIn the end, you realize that the only way to describe the one is to say that itās āgoodā or āpositiveā, and that you can only describe the other by saying itās ābadā or ānegativeā. ā
Was this not a motivating example for her view? Or just proposed as an example where the descriptive and normative may overlap?
Does she have a specific descriptive definition of pleasure sheās working with that doesnāt directly use normative terms but from which she can derive its normative goodness? (I donāt expect a persuasive solution to the is-ought problem; at some point you need to assume a normative fact to obtain any further ones, and I think we could prove this formally.)