On the second essay, with respect to the reliability argument:
“R2. Phenomenal introspection is reliable in generating belief that pleasure is good”
Some people, like tranquilists and some moral antirealists, don’t have the belief that pleasure is good, even after phenomenal introspection. So either pleasure is not good, or phenomenal introspection is not (perfectly) reliable, undermining R1 and the rest of the argument. The author also refers to disagreement as reason to doubt the reliability of a process in R3.
“Phenomenal introspection generates belief that pleasure is good, just as it generates belief that sound-experience has volume.”
Maybe this comes down to definitions and is kind of besides the point, but inner monologues don’t seem to have volume, at least not my own.
On the second essay, with respect to the reliability argument:
“R2. Phenomenal introspection is reliable in generating belief that pleasure is good”
Some people, like tranquilists and some moral antirealists, don’t have the belief that pleasure is good, even after phenomenal introspection. So either pleasure is not good, or phenomenal introspection is not (perfectly) reliable, undermining R1 and the rest of the argument. The author also refers to disagreement as reason to doubt the reliability of a process in R3.
“Phenomenal introspection generates belief that pleasure is good, just as it generates belief that sound-experience has volume.”
Maybe this comes down to definitions and is kind of besides the point, but inner monologues don’t seem to have volume, at least not my own.