Do you intend for the population to recover in B, or extinction with no future people? In the post, you write that the second virus âwill kill everybody on earthâ. Iâd assume that means extinction.
If B (killing 8 billion necessary people) does mean extinction and you think B is better than A, then you prefer extinction to extra future deaths. And your argument seems general, e.g. we should just go extinct now to prevent the deaths of future people. If theyâre never born, they canât die. Youâd be assigning negative value to additional deaths, but no positive value to additional lives. The view would be antinatalist.
Or, if you think B is just no worse than A (equivalent or incomparable), then extinction is permissible, in order to prevent the deaths of future people.
If you allow population recovery in B, then (symmetric) wide person-affecting views can say B is better than A, although it could depend on how many future/âcontingent people will exist in each scenario. If the number is the same or larger in B and dying earlier is worse than dying later, then B would be better. If itâs lower in B, then you may need to discount some of the extra early deaths in A.
Thanks! I was indeed assuming total extinction in B. As you say, antinatalist views will prefer A to B. If antinatalism is correct, then my argument against the intuition of neutrality fails.
Our discussion has been helpful to me, because itâs made me realise that my argument is really directed against views that accept the intuition of neutrality, but arenât either (a) antinatalist or (b) narrow person-affecting.
That does limit its scope. Nevertheless, common sense morality seems to accept the intuition of neutrality, but not anti-natalism. Nor does it seem to accept narrow person-affecting views (thus most laypeopleâs embrace of the No Difference View when it comes to the non-identity problem). Itâs that âmoderate middleâ, so to speak, at whom my argument is directed.
Still, I think your argument is in fact an argument for antinatalism, or can be turned into one, based on the features of the problem to which youâve been sensitive here so far. If you rejected antinatalism, then your argument proves too much and you should discount it, or you should be more sympathetic to antinatalism (or both).
You say B prevents more deaths, because it will prevent deaths of future people from the virus. But it prevents those future deaths by also preventing those people from existing.
So, for B to be better than A, youâre saying itâs worse for extra people to exist than not exist, and the reason itâs worse is that they will die. Or that the will die early, but early relative to what? Thereâs no counterfactual in which they live longer, the way youâve set the problem up. They die early relative to other people around them or perhaps without achieving major life goals they would have achieved if they didnât die early, I guess.
Similarly, going extinct now prevents more deaths from all causes, including age-related ones, but also everything that causes people to die early, like car accidents, war, diseases in young people, etc.. The effects are essentially the same.
Whatâs special about the virus in this hypothetical vs all other causes of (early) death in humans?
So, we should prevent (early) deaths by going extinct now, or collectively refusing to have children, if the alternative is the status quo with many (early) deaths for a long time. That looks like an principle antinatalist position.
I think weâre talking past each other. My claim is that taking precautionary measures in case A will prevent more deaths in expectation (17 billion/â1000 = 17 million) than taking precautionary measures in case B (8 billion/â1000 = 8 million). We can all agree that itâs better, other things being equal, to save more deaths in expectation than fewer. On the Intuition of Neutrality, other things seemingly are equal, making it more important to take precautionary measures against the virus in A than against the virus in B.
But this is a reductio ad absurdum. Would it really be better for humanity to go extinct than to suffer ten million deaths from the virus per year for the next thousand years? And if not, shouldnât we accept that the reason is that additional (good) lives have value?
I donât think itâs true that other things are equal on the intuition of neutrality, after saying there are more deaths in A than B. The lives and deaths of the contingent/âfuture people in A wouldnât count at all on symmetric person-affecting views (narrow or wide). On some asymmetric person-affecting views, they might count, but the bad lives count fully, while the additional good lives only offset (possibly fully offset) but never outweigh the additional bad lives, so the extra lives and deaths need not count on net.
On the intuition of neutrality, there are more deaths that count in B, basically except if youâre an antinatalist (about this case).
What person-affecting views satisfying neutrality do you imagine would recommend B/âextinction/âtaking precautions against A here?
For an argument against neutrality that isnât just against antinatalism, I think you want to define B so that itâs better than or as good as A for necessary people. For example, the virus in B makes everyone infertile without killing them (but the virus in A kills people). Or, fewer people are killed early on in B, and the rest decide not to have children. Or, the deaths in A (for the necessary people) are painful and extended, but painless in B.
Do you intend for the population to recover in B, or extinction with no future people? In the post, you write that the second virus âwill kill everybody on earthâ. Iâd assume that means extinction.
If B (killing 8 billion necessary people) does mean extinction and you think B is better than A, then you prefer extinction to extra future deaths. And your argument seems general, e.g. we should just go extinct now to prevent the deaths of future people. If theyâre never born, they canât die. Youâd be assigning negative value to additional deaths, but no positive value to additional lives. The view would be antinatalist.
Or, if you think B is just no worse than A (equivalent or incomparable), then extinction is permissible, in order to prevent the deaths of future people.
If you allow population recovery in B, then (symmetric) wide person-affecting views can say B is better than A, although it could depend on how many future/âcontingent people will exist in each scenario. If the number is the same or larger in B and dying earlier is worse than dying later, then B would be better. If itâs lower in B, then you may need to discount some of the extra early deaths in A.
Thanks! I was indeed assuming total extinction in B. As you say, antinatalist views will prefer A to B. If antinatalism is correct, then my argument against the intuition of neutrality fails.
Our discussion has been helpful to me, because itâs made me realise that my argument is really directed against views that accept the intuition of neutrality, but arenât either (a) antinatalist or (b) narrow person-affecting.
That does limit its scope. Nevertheless, common sense morality seems to accept the intuition of neutrality, but not anti-natalism. Nor does it seem to accept narrow person-affecting views (thus most laypeopleâs embrace of the No Difference View when it comes to the non-identity problem). Itâs that âmoderate middleâ, so to speak, at whom my argument is directed.
Still, I think your argument is in fact an argument for antinatalism, or can be turned into one, based on the features of the problem to which youâve been sensitive here so far. If you rejected antinatalism, then your argument proves too much and you should discount it, or you should be more sympathetic to antinatalism (or both).
You say B prevents more deaths, because it will prevent deaths of future people from the virus. But it prevents those future deaths by also preventing those people from existing.
So, for B to be better than A, youâre saying itâs worse for extra people to exist than not exist, and the reason itâs worse is that they will die. Or that the will die early, but early relative to what? Thereâs no counterfactual in which they live longer, the way youâve set the problem up. They die early relative to other people around them or perhaps without achieving major life goals they would have achieved if they didnât die early, I guess.
Similarly, going extinct now prevents more deaths from all causes, including age-related ones, but also everything that causes people to die early, like car accidents, war, diseases in young people, etc.. The effects are essentially the same.
Whatâs special about the virus in this hypothetical vs all other causes of (early) death in humans?
So, we should prevent (early) deaths by going extinct now, or collectively refusing to have children, if the alternative is the status quo with many (early) deaths for a long time. That looks like an principle antinatalist position.
I think weâre talking past each other. My claim is that taking precautionary measures in case A will prevent more deaths in expectation (17 billion/â1000 = 17 million) than taking precautionary measures in case B (8 billion/â1000 = 8 million). We can all agree that itâs better, other things being equal, to save more deaths in expectation than fewer. On the Intuition of Neutrality, other things seemingly are equal, making it more important to take precautionary measures against the virus in A than against the virus in B.
But this is a reductio ad absurdum. Would it really be better for humanity to go extinct than to suffer ten million deaths from the virus per year for the next thousand years? And if not, shouldnât we accept that the reason is that additional (good) lives have value?
I donât think itâs true that other things are equal on the intuition of neutrality, after saying there are more deaths in A than B. The lives and deaths of the contingent/âfuture people in A wouldnât count at all on symmetric person-affecting views (narrow or wide). On some asymmetric person-affecting views, they might count, but the bad lives count fully, while the additional good lives only offset (possibly fully offset) but never outweigh the additional bad lives, so the extra lives and deaths need not count on net.
On the intuition of neutrality, there are more deaths that count in B, basically except if youâre an antinatalist (about this case).
What person-affecting views satisfying neutrality do you imagine would recommend B/âextinction/âtaking precautions against A here?
For an argument against neutrality that isnât just against antinatalism, I think you want to define B so that itâs better than or as good as A for necessary people. For example, the virus in B makes everyone infertile without killing them (but the virus in A kills people). Or, fewer people are killed early on in B, and the rest decide not to have children. Or, the deaths in A (for the necessary people) are painful and extended, but painless in B.