Under this interpretation I would say my position is doubt that positive welfare exists in the first place. Thereâs only the negation or absence of negative welfare. So to my ears itâs like arguing 5 x 0 > 1 x 0. (Edit: Perhaps a better analogy, if suffering is like dust that can be removed by the vacuum-cleaner of happiness, it doesnât make sense to say that vacuuming a perfectly clean floor for 5 minutes is better than doing so for 1 minute, or not at all.)
Taken in isolation I can see how counterintuitive this sounds, but in the context of observations about confounders and the instrumental value of happiness, itâs quite sensible to me compared with the alternatives. In particular, it doesnât commit us to biting the bullets I mentioned in my last comment, doesnât violate transitivity, and accounts for the procreation asymmetry intuition. The main downside I think is the implication that death is not bad for the dying person themselves, but I donât find this unacceptable considering: (a) itâs quite consistent with e.g. Epicurean and Buddhist views, not âout thereâ in the history of philosophy, and (b) practically speaking every life is entangled with others so that even if my death isnât a tragedy to myself, it is a strong tragedy to people who care about or depend on me.
Under this interpretation I would say my position is doubt that positive welfare exists in the first place. Thereâs only the negation or absence of negative welfare. So to my ears itâs like arguing 5 x 0 > 1 x 0. (Edit: Perhaps a better analogy, if suffering is like dust that can be removed by the vacuum-cleaner of happiness, it doesnât make sense to say that vacuuming a perfectly clean floor for 5 minutes is better than doing so for 1 minute, or not at all.)
Taken in isolation I can see how counterintuitive this sounds, but in the context of observations about confounders and the instrumental value of happiness, itâs quite sensible to me compared with the alternatives. In particular, it doesnât commit us to biting the bullets I mentioned in my last comment, doesnât violate transitivity, and accounts for the procreation asymmetry intuition. The main downside I think is the implication that death is not bad for the dying person themselves, but I donât find this unacceptable considering: (a) itâs quite consistent with e.g. Epicurean and Buddhist views, not âout thereâ in the history of philosophy, and (b) practically speaking every life is entangled with others so that even if my death isnât a tragedy to myself, it is a strong tragedy to people who care about or depend on me.